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ABSTRACT
Antitrust law condemns price-fixing cartels and seeks to encourage
private suits against the conspirators by automatically trebling
antitrust damages and by providing for joint and several liability.
Because the Supreme Court has held that there is no right to
contribution among antitrust violators, this creates the risk of a single
defendant being saddled with damages significantly greater than three
times the amount of the harm associated with that firm’s own market
share.
Firms engaged in—or accused of—price fixing often try to
ameliorate this risk by entering into judgment-sharing agreements,
which essentially create a right to contribution through contract.
Despite their ubiquity, judgment-sharing agreements have received
almost no scholarly attention. Courts and commentators uniformly
praise them as a reasonable way for firms to manage risk and
eliminate the perceived unfairness of joint and several liability without
a right to contribution.
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This Article shows how judgment-sharing agreements can
undermine antitrust deterrence and stabilize price-fixing cartels. Using
both economic theory and empirical evidence, the Article explains
how judgment-sharing agreements may reduce settlement values, lead
to the suppression of incriminating evidence, reduce the likelihood of
success of meritorious price-fixing suits, and make price fixing costbeneficial. The Article then argues that fairness arguments in favor of
judgment-sharing agreements (and contribution more generally) are
misguided and easily disproved, and in any event outweighed by the
potential anticompetitive effects of such agreements. Finally, the
Article advocates a more informed antitrust treatment of judgmentsharing agreements that takes into account their potential use for
anticompetitive purposes.
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INTRODUCTION
Longevity breeds legitimacy. The longer that a particular form of
conduct endures, the more reasonable and uncontroversial it seems.
One example of this phenomenon in the context of antitrust litigation
involves contracts among codefendants. Defendants in price-fixing
suits often enter into judgment-sharing agreements, in which the firms
agree by contract to allocate financial responsibility for any private
liability among them. For example, if five firms of relatively equal size
are alleged to have formed a price-fixing conspiracy, the defendants
might agree to each pay 20 percent of the total damages (if any)
either awarded to the plaintiff following trial or agreed to in
settlement with the plaintiff—even if the plaintiff declines to sue all of
the cartel’s members or some of the defendants are found not liable.
At first glance, such judgment-sharing agreements (JSAs) seem
harmless—a mechanism for defendants to spread risk. And JSAs are
widespread, although their contents are generally confidential.
Courts and commentators embrace JSAs because they are
common and because the contracts appear so desirable at first glance.
As their name indicates, judgment-sharing agreements involve
sharing, a benevolent act that we are taught to value at an early age.
By their terms, JSAs spread risk among firms at risk of liability for
high damages. Such agreements seem economically similar to
insurance pooling or maintaining a diversified stock portfolio—
uncontroversial conduct in any modern economy. Through sharing
and risk spreading, judgment-sharing agreements reduce uncertainty
and impose some measure of responsibility on every signatory to the
agreement.
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Despite their ubiquity, no scholarship addresses the potential
negative aspects of judgment-sharing agreements. Unfortunately,
beyond their benign rationales, JSAs may provide succor to pricefixing conspiracies. This Article explains how JSAs, by distorting the
settlement process in private antitrust litigation, can help both
stabilize illegal cartels and create additional incentives for cartel firms
to conceal price-fixing activities. As a result, JSAs undermine key
goals of antitrust law: deterring, exposing, and punishing illegal price
fixing.
Part I of this Article explains the high stakes inherent in private
antitrust litigation and notes the development of JSAs. Antitrust
damages are automatically trebled. Both settlements and jury awards
in antitrust cases often measure in the hundreds of millions of dollars
and can exceed one billion dollars. Price-fixing defendants are jointly
and severally liable for all damages caused by their conspiracy. But
because antitrust doctrine does not include contribution rights, any
single member of the conspiracy could be liable for three times the
damages caused by all of the cartel participants. In an attempt to
mitigate the harsh cumulative effects of these rules, antitrust
defendants asked courts to recognize a right to contribution among
price-fixing defendants. Those efforts having failed, many firms
lobbied Congress to create a statutory right to contribution in
antitrust law. With no statutory relief forthcoming, many price-fixing
defendants sought to create contribution through contract by entering
into judgment-sharing agreements. Courts, commentators, and
members of Congress have generally assumed that JSAs are legal;
none, however, has analyzed the potential anticompetitive effects of
such agreements.
Part II presents the arguments in support of JSAs. JSAs benefit
the signatories—defendants in price-fixing cases—by facilitating
business planning and allowing firms to spread risk. More
importantly, JSAs prevent antitrust plaintiffs from leveraging the
threat of enormous liability against individual firms to coerce
settlements out of defendants afraid of being held responsible for the
bulk of the damages caused by the entire price-fixing cartel. Most
often, proponents of antitrust contribution assert that the absence of
contribution disproportionately hurts smaller and even innocent
defendants in price-fixing litigation. JSAs offer a way to ameliorate
that harm. Furthermore, proponents of JSAs argue that the
agreements enhance deterrence of cartels by increasing the likelihood
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that every member of a price-fixing conspiracy will have to pay
something to successful antitrust plaintiffs.
Part III refutes the arguments presented in Part II and explains
how JSAs may help create, stabilize, and conceal price-fixing
conspiracies. First, the arguments in favor of JSAs are overstated. No
empirical evidence shows that the no-contribution regime inflicts
unfair pressure against innocent or small defendants. Antitrust law
already provides many mechanisms that allow firms to manage the
risks of legitimate agreements among competitors. Second, JSAs
distort the settlement process in price-fixing litigation, reducing both
the probability of reaching settlements and the value of negotiated
settlements. Third, JSAs can help conceal a cartel by reducing cartel
members’ incentive to collect and reveal evidence. Fourth, JSAs can
stabilize a price-fixing cartel by solving the prisoners’ dilemma
associated with illegal conspiracies in which each member of the
conspiracy has an incentive to defect. Perhaps not surprisingly, those
firms most likely to form cartels are the ones most likely to sign JSAs.
Ultimately, JSAs undermine the deterrent effect of laws against price
fixing. Part IV weighs the fairness and deterrence arguments both for
and against JSAs and concludes that the deterrent effects prevail.
Finally, Part V explores various antitrust approaches to JSAs.
Part V explains why the confidentiality of JSAs creates problems for
antitrust law and argues that JSAs should be discoverable. Because
JSAs may undermine the prohibition against price fixing, antitrust
scholars and judges must evaluate whether antitrust law should
condemn JSAs and, if so, under what circumstances. A range of
proposals is possible: make JSAs unenforceable, condemn JSAs as
per se illegal, or evaluate JSAs under the rule of reason. Such analysis
should consider the terms, timing, and signatories to the agreement.
After evaluating these various approaches, Part V explores the role of
JSAs in proving an underlying price-fixing agreement and advocates
treating JSAs as a “plus factor” in antitrust analysis.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDGMENT-SHARING AGREEMENTS
Price-fixing defendants created judgment-sharing agreements in
response to an antitrust landscape that permitted significant
disparities in the damages paid by defendants in the same cartel.
Part I explains the antitrust damages regime and how defendants
created JSAs to moderate the perceived harshness of this regime.
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A. The High Stakes of Price-Fixing Litigation
For firms found liable for conspiring to fix prices, antitrust law
can pack quite a punch. First, total damages in price-fixing cases are
often high for two reasons: damages are measured by the cartel’s
1
overcharge, which can exceed one billion dollars, and the plaintiff’s
2
actual damages are automatically trebled. Also, antitrust class actions
can aggregate thousands of claims into a single lawsuit and the tolling
of the statute of limitations due to fraudulent concealment means that
the damages often go back much further than antitrust’s four-year
3
statute of limitations might otherwise imply.
4
Second, antitrust law provides for joint and several liability.
Thus, each price-fixing firm is liable for the overcharges on its co5
conspirators’ sales. As its cartel partners earn illegal profits, each
individual firm is legally responsible for triple the overcharge secured
by its putative competitor. Any single price-fixing firm can be held
accountable for the trebled value of the cartel’s total overcharges.
Third, even when plaintiffs sue multiple cartel members, an early
settlement with one firm can leave the remaining defendants on the
hook for significant damages attributable to the settling defendant’s
sales. Although the remaining defendants receive a credit for any
settlement—to prevent the plaintiff from receiving a double
recovery—the settlement amount is subtracted from defendants’

1. See, e.g., In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503, 507
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) ($3.4 billion settlement).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006).
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 15b; see also, e.g., In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., No. MISC 99197(TFH), 2000 WL 1475705, at *2–3 (D.D.C. May 9, 2000) (explaining that the plaintiffs’ case
survived a motion to dismiss in which fraudulent concealment tolled the statute of limitations,
extending the period for which recovery was available); In re Catfish Antitrust Litig., 826 F.
Supp. 1019, 1029 (N.D. Miss. 1993) (“[F]raudulent concealment tolls the Clayton Act’s statute
of limitations.”).
4. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 144 (1968) (White, J.,
concurring) (“[D]amages normally may be had from either or both defendants without regard
to their relative responsibility for originating the combination or their different roles in
effectuating its ends.”); Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Tex. Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 904
n.15 (5th Cir. 1979), aff’d sub nom. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630
(1981); Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 11 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (“It is well settled that an
antitrust action is a tort action and that in multi-defendant antitrust actions the co-conspirator
joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of damages caused by their
acts.” (citations omitted)).
5. E.g., Dee-K Enters., Inc. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd., 982 F. Supp. 1138, 1155 (E.D. Va.
1997).
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6

damages only after the total damages are trebled. On the one hand,
this policy encourages settlements because otherwise “each dollar
received in settlement would cause a three-dollar reduction in the
7
judgment at trial.” But because a settling defendant generally pays at
most the single damages associated with its own sales, the remaining
defendants risk being liable for the trebled-damage component of any
8
overcharges on the settling defendant’s sales.
Fourth, while contribution would significantly minimize the
effects of joint and several liability, antitrust law recognizes no right
9
to contribution. Early cases consistently held that antitrust
10
defendants had no right to contribution until the Eighth Circuit
forged new ground in 1979 by permitting an antitrust defendant to
11
sue its co-conspirators for contribution. The Supreme Court soon
12
resolved the split in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
holding that antitrust defendants did not possess a right to
6. Burlington Indus. v. Milliken & Co., 690 F.2d 380, 391 (4th Cir. 1982); Flintkote Co. v.
Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 398 (9th Cir. 1957); A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH NO. 11,
CONTRIBUTION AND CLAIM REDUCTION IN ANTITRUST LITIGATION 5 (1986); see also Donald
J. Polden & E. Thomas Sullivan, Contribution and Claim Reduction in Antitrust Litigation: A
Legislative Analysis, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 397, 402–03 (1983) (discussing Burlington
Industries).
7. Yosef J. Riemer, Note, Sharing Agreements Among Defendants in Antitrust Cases, 52
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 289, 304 (1984); see also Hydrolevel Corp. v. Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs,
Inc., 635 F.2d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[D]eduction of settlement proceeds before trebling
would discourage settlement by making litigation relatively more profitable for plaintiffs: every
dollar received in settlement would cause a three dollar reduction in the judgment at trial.”),
aff’d, 456 U.S. 989 (1982).
8. See A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH NO. 13, TREBLE-DAMAGES REMEDY
15 (1986) (“Settling defendants rarely pay treble the overcharge resulting from their sales.
Therefore, settlements have the potential of leaving the last co-conspirator in a suit liable for
damages enormously greater than the overcharge caused by its sales pursuant to the
conspiracy.”); Paula A. Hutchinson, Note, A Case Against Contribution in Antitrust, 58 TEX. L.
REV. 961, 980 (1980) (“[T]he nonsettling defendants bear the risk that the plaintiff will settle
with another defendant for less than the amount of damages directly attributable to it.”).
9. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2337–38 (2007) (“Contribution is
defined as the ‘tortfeasor’s right to collect from others responsible for the same tort after the
tortfeasor has paid more than his or her proportionate share, the shares being determined as a
percentage of fault.’” (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 353 (8th ed. 1999))).
10. See, e.g., El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., No. C-75-2492 AJZ, 1976 WL 1382, at
*3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 1976); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp.
1339, 1346 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. C 75-104, 1977 WL
1484, at *1 (D. Utah Oct. 25, 1977), aff’d, 649 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1979).
11. Prof’l Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Nat’l Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir.
1979), abrogated by Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
12. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
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contribution and that only Congress could create such a right.
Absent any right to contribution, joint and several liability means that
a prevailing antitrust plaintiff can collect all of its damage award from
a single conspirator who cannot sue its co-conspirators to pay their
14
“fair share.” And because neither a government nor a private
plaintiff is required to sue every suspected member of an alleged
15
price-fixing conspiracy, a single price-fixing conspirator could find
16
itself alone in court with potentially staggering exposure.
Prior to and following the Supreme Court’s decision in Texas
Industries, Congress considered a flurry of proposals to allow
17
contribution in antitrust cases. Congress also debated legislation to
eliminate joint and several liability for antitrust claims and to subtract
18
settlement amounts before trebling. However, none of these
19
proposals succeeded. Antitrust defendants thus took matters into
their own hands.
B. Judgment-Sharing Agreements
With Congress declining to create a statutory right to
contribution, many antitrust defendants have fashioned a contractual
20
right to contribution by entering into judgment-sharing agreements.
13. Id. at 646 (“[R]egardless of the merits of the conflicting arguments, this is a matter for
Congress, not the courts, to resolve.”).
14. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 8, at 13–14.
15. E.g., Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 8 (9th Cir. 1963) (“A
plaintiff need not sue all conspirators; he may choose to sue but one.”); Note, Contribution and
Antitrust Policy, 78 MICH. L. REV. 890, 891 n.5 (1980) (“Similarly, the government need not sue
all possible conspirators in a civil antitrust suit, and need not name all conspirators in a criminal
antitrust indictment.” (citing United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 129 n.2 (1966);
United States v. Gasoline Retailers Ass’n, 285 F.2d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 1961))).
16. See Edward D. Cavanagh, Contribution, Claim Reduction, and Individual Treble
Damage Responsibility: Which Path to Reform of Antitrust Remedies?, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1277,
1284 (1987) (“For many firms, the risk of a catastrophic judgment is unacceptably high . . . .”).
17. See Polden & Sullivan, supra note 6, at 403–08.
One possible alternative to full contribution is an option called “carve-out,” which
“permits reduction before trebling of a plaintiff’s monetary claim against nonsettling defendants
after one defendant has executed a settlement pact with plaintiffs.” Mark McCareins, Carve-Out
as an Answer to the Contribution Question in Private Antitrust Litigation, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 975,
1008–09 (1980) (advocating carve-out).
18. Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1281.
19. See Burlington Indus. v. Milliken & Co., 690 F.2d 380, 394 (4th Cir. 1982) (“[J]oint and
several liability . . . has been the established doctrine of antitrust law for the better part of a
century . . . which Congress has not seen fit to disapprove.”)
20. See A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 19 (“A sharing agreement is, in
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A JSA is a contract among antitrust defendants (and potential
antitrust defendants) whereby the signatories agree in advance to
their relative responsibility for any antitrust damages awarded at trial
against any of them. In theory, these agreed-upon percentages reflect
21
“each defendant’s relative role in the alleged conspiracy.”
Defendants often use market share as the basis for assigning damage
22
responsibility in a JSA. In some cases, the JSA provides that the
antitrust defendants will submit to arbitration to determine their
percentage of any damages paid, either through settlement or at
23
trial.
While once cutting edge, JSAs have become “fairly common” in
24
antitrust litigation. When a price-fixing claim is filed against them,
many firms reflexively attempt to negotiate a JSA among the named
25
defendants. JSAs are particularly common when there are a small

essence, contractual contribution.”); Mark Call Dickinson, Note, Contribution in Antitrust
Treble Damage Actions, 6 J. CORP. L. 141, 163 (1980) (“The sharing agreement can be seen to
be the equivalent of self-imposed rules of contribution . . . .”).
21. Dickinson, supra note 20, at 163.
22. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 13.23 (4th ed. 2004); Riemer, supra note 7, at
295; see also, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL
997, 1995 WL 221853, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 1995) (mem.) (discussing a JSA using a modified
market share approach); S. REP. NO. 96-428, at 4 (1979) (“The liability is . . . based on an
assessment of the damages attributable to each defendant’s specific relative benefit from the
price-fixed sales weighted by the amount of the overcharge as reflected in its individual sales or
purchases.”).
23. Lisa Bernstein & Daniel Klerman, An Economic Analysis of Mary Carter Settlement
Agreements, 83 GEO. L.J. 2215, 2270 n.149 (1995).
24. Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Corporate Compliance Ethics and Malpractice Prevention, 1526
PLI/CORP. 1387, 1401 (Jan.–Feb. 2006); Dickinson, supra note 20, at 163 (“[M]any defendants
involved in private treble damage actions have joined forces and entered into judgment sharing
agreements.”); Note, supra note 15, at 909 (“[S]haring agreements are fairly common among
larger antitrust defendants in class action suits . . . .”).
25. Antitrust Damage Allocation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and
Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 7 (1982) [hereinafter Antitrust
Damage Allocation Hearings] (statement of A. Stephens Clay, Esq., Kilpatrick & Cody) (“At
the beginning of any major antitrust litigation involving an alleged horizontal price fixing
conspiracy among several defendants, defense counsel typically will meet with each other to
determine if their clients are willing to enter into a so-called ‘sharing agreement.’”); id. at 25–26
(statement of Stephen D. Susman, Esq., Susman & McGowan) (arguing that “in every major
antitrust conspiracy case, one of the first things the defendants do is get together and see if they
can enter into a sharing agreement” but noting that negotiations often do not result in JSAs);
Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act of 1979, S. 1468: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust,
Monopoly and Business Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 85 (1979)
[hereinafter Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings] (statement of Robert P. Taylor) (noting
that the attempt to achieve a JSA “is one of the first things” that price-fixing defendants do); S.
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number of defendants because the relevant market is concentrated.
Defendants often face difficulty negotiating JSAs, however, as they
debate what each defendant’s relative financial responsibility should
27
be. In many cases, the parties can reach no accord, and they proceed
28
into litigation as traditional codefendants, each firm out for itself.
Ultimately, no one knows the precise number of JSAs because
29
defendants generally treat them as confidential contracts.
Despite their ubiquity, no scholarship addresses the many
potential negative consequences—including anticompetitive effects—
of JSAs. Most observers simply assume that JSAs are valid and
30
enforceable. When noting the possible use of JSAs to avoid the
potential inequities of antitrust litigation during congressional
REP. NO. 96-428, at 41 (supplemental views of Sen. Metzenbaum & Sen. Kennedy) (“Large
defendants often attempt, to reach liability sharing agreements among all defendants who go to
trial.”).
26. See Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 142 (statement of Robert
P. Taylor, Esq., Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro); S. REP. NO. 96-428, at 2.
27. See Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings, supra note 25, at 121 (statement of
Donald T. Hibner, Attorney) (“[Judgment-sharing] agreements are incredibly complex and
difficult to negotiate. Where the defendants are few, of relatively the same size, and have
relatively the same degree of innocence or guilt, such agreements are feasible. Where other
factors are present, they are not.”).
28. Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 142 (statement of Robert P.
Taylor, Esq., Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro) (“In a great many cases, however, because of
disparities in size, culpability, market share or other such factors, defendants are not able to
negotiate sharing agreements.”); id. at 232 n.14 (letter from Hon. Charles B. Renfrew, Pillsbury,
Madison & Sutro, to members of the H. Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law)
(“[P]rivate sharing agreements . . . frequently cannot be negotiated . . . .”).
29. Riemer, supra note 7, at 290 n.8 (“Because defendants often enter into sharing
agreements on a confidential basis and then claim that the existence and terms of any such
agreement are privileged as part of their joint defense, it is difficult to determine the extent to
which sharing agreements are used.” (citations omitted)); see also A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION,
supra note 6, at 20 (“Unfortunately, there exists no helpful data measuring the frequency of use
of sharing agreements.”); infra notes 266–71 (advocating that JSAs should be discoverable).
30. See, e.g., Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 7 (statement of A.
Stephens Clay, Esq., Kilpatrick & Cody); id. at 135 (statement of Robert P. Taylor, Esq.,
Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro); id. at 231 (letter from Hon. Charles B. Renfrew, Pillsbury,
Madison & Sutro, to members of the H. Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law); id. at
266 (statement of Hubert L. Will, J., United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois); id. at 444 (letter from Denis P. McInerney, Esq., Cahill, Gordon & Reindel, to Peter
W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary); id. at 448 (“Private sharing agreements
are lawful . . . .”); id. at 474 (letter from James F. Rill, Esq., Collier, Shannon, Rill & Scott, to
Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary); id. at 479 (letter from Robert P.
Taylor, Esq., Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, to Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the
Judiciary) (“Many lawyers believe that judgment sharing agreements are lawful and
enforceable . . . .”); Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1326–27 (citing S. REP. NO. 97-359, at 2 (1982)).
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debates in the 1980s regarding contribution among antitrust
defendants, the head of the Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s)
31
Antitrust Division implicitly supported such sharing agreements. No
32
witnesses during the proceedings considered the dangers of JSAs.
Indeed, some in Congress apparently believed that JSAs diminished
the need for a statutory right to contribution among alleged price
33
fixers. More recently, although noting that courts have the authority
to decline to enforce JSAs that violate public policy, the Manual for
34
Complex Litigation describes them as “generally appropriate.” Even
when acknowledging their power to disallow JSAs, courts consistently
35
uphold such arrangements as legal contracts. Judges have reasoned
that although federal antitrust law does not recognize a right to
contribution, the Court in Texas Industries did not prohibit
defendants from acting on their own to effect contribution through
36
contract.
II. THE CASE FOR JUDGMENT-SHARING AGREEMENTS
What little is written about JSAs enthusiastically supports these
37
contracts. Just as contribution spreads risk, JSAs provide a
38
mechanism for defendants in price-fixing cases to manage risk. The

31. See Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 467 (letter from William F.
Baxter, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, to Peter W. Rodino,
Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“Of course, there is nothing in the Department’s
proposal that would negate the possibility of defendants entering into sharing agreements after
the passage of the proposed legislation; in fact, the legislation may well create strong incentives
among defendants to enter into such agreements to avoid the potential and divisive costs of
contribution litigation.”).
32. See S. REP. NO. 96-428, at 26 (1979).
33. Id. at 2 (“In many cases, defendants can arrange to enter into sharing agreements—
usually based on relative sales—to apportion the liability among themselves in a way that will
avoid grossly disproportionate payments by any one defendant.”).
34. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 22, § 13.23.
35. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST EVIDENCE HANDBOOK 61 (2d ed. 2002)
(“Courts have upheld sharing agreements in antitrust cases against challenges to their validity.”
(citations omitted)); see also Bernstein & Klerman, supra note 23, at 2270 n.149 (“Such
agreements are generally upheld despite the fact that they will affect the defendants’ trial
strategy and their incentives to testify in particular ways at trial.”).
36. Cimarron Pipeline Constr., Inc., v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., Nos. CIV-89-822-T,
CIV-89-1886-T, 1992 WL 350612, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 10, 1992).
37. See Hutchinson, supra note 8, at 961.
38. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 19 (“Sharing agreements are attractive to
defendants precisely because they manage the risk of a potentially large judgment and dampen
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arguments advanced for JSAs fall into two categories: JSAs are good
for the signatories, and JSAs are good for antitrust policy overall.
A. Benefits for Signatories
Commentators support JSAs as a mechanism to constrain the
power of antitrust plaintiffs to unfairly exploit price-fixing
defendants. Plaintiffs bringing antitrust lawsuits often need money to
finance the litigation. Some plaintiffs are willing to accept relatively
modest early settlements with one or more defendants in order to
39
finance the litigation against the remaining defendants. Defendants
in price-fixing cases also share an incentive to settle antitrust litigation
early because they can often buy repose at a more affordable price.
Once an antitrust plaintiff has secured litigation financing through an
early settlement, it can engage in harder bargaining in settlement
negotiations with the remaining alleged co-conspirators. This means
that later-settling defendants often pay more than their codefendants
40
who settled earlier. In some cases, antitrust plaintiffs actually
announce that each subsequent settlement will take place at
41
“progressively higher rates.” Some plaintiffs go further and bind
themselves by including most-favored-nation clauses in their early
settlement agreements, which assure the earlier-settling defendants
that the later-settling defendants cannot receive more favorable
42
settlement terms.
Much of an antitrust plaintiff’s leverage to demand higher
payments from slow-moving defendants comes from the nonsettling

the competition for early, cheap settlements.”).
39. See Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 37–38 (statement of Denis
McInerney, Esq., Cahill, Gordon & Reindel). This is particularly true with antitrust class actions
in which the class counsel has a vested interest in securing guaranteed money upfront, lest they
be out their costs.
40. See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL
997, 1995 WL 221853, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 1995) (mem.) (“The plaintiffs ‘take small
amounts . . . at the beginning of the settlement process’ and larger amounts as time progresses.”
(quotation error in original) (quoting The Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act: Hearings Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 482 (1982))); Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1288 n.67
(providing settlement figures in corrugated container litigation).
41. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 15–16 (“In fact, the plaintiffs openly
announced that each settlement in the case would be at progressively higher rates, and each
settlement agreement contained a ‘most favored nation clause’ that assured that succeeding
settlements would be no more favorable.” (footnote omitted)).
42. Id.
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defendants’ ever-increasing exposure. Because of the features of the
antitrust damages regime discussed in Part I, as each alleged coconspirator in a case settles, the remaining defendants are faced with
a significantly greater amount of exposure. The lingering defendants
remain liable for all of the damages suffered by an antitrust plaintiff,
with the relatively small previous settlement subtracted only after
43
trebling the total damages associated with the conspiracy. As the
number of defendants dwindles, both the absolute and relative level
of damages increases for the remaining defendants. This creates a so44
called whipsaw effect that imposes “great pressure on a defendant to
settle early so as not to be exposed to the lion’s share of the joint
45
trebled damages.”
Defense counsel and critics condemn this whipsaw effect as
coercive and fundamentally unfair. The whipsaw effect is arguably
coercive because with each settlement by one of the defendants, the
remaining defendants face significantly greater exposure—they are
potentially responsible for all of the damages—trebled—associated
with the exiting defendants’ sales (minus the settlement). “The actual
risk of a nonsettling defendant’s liability increases inversely to the
number of nonsettling defendants because fewer defendants are left
46
to share in the judgment.” Knowing this, plaintiff’s counsel can
47
demand more money from later-settling defendants. Defendant
firms that are more accustomed to settlement negotiations being an
exercise in compromise—in which the parties’ settlement figures
eventually converge—resent when plaintiffs increase their settlement
48
demands after each successive settlement. Because firms worry
about being the last defendant that could be responsible for the bulk
of all the damages caused by the cartel, firms may be desperate to
49
settle first or at least not be excluded from a universal settlement. In

43. Note, supra note 15, at 907.
44. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 15; Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1294.
45. WILLIAM BREIT & KENNETH G. ELZINGA, ANTITRUST PENALTY REFORM: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 29 (1986).
46. McCareins, supra note 17, at 997.
47. Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 37–38 (statement of Denis
McInerney, Esq., Cahill, Gordon & Reindel).
48. See Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1289–90.
49. See Note, supra note 15, at 906 (discussing an example of a firm that acquiesced to
global settlement).
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some cases, codefendants seem to “stampede” to the plaintiff to
avoid being the firm discussing settlement from the most vulnerable
51
position. Some judges have asserted that when the majority of
52
defendants have already settled with the antitrust plaintiff, the
pressure on the remaining defendants to settle is “inherently
coercive” because they cannot risk going to trial given the staggering
53
potential damages. Even a defendant that was previously willing to
go to trial may have a change of heart as its potential liability
54
increases as its codefendants settle.
In addition to its coercive effect, some observers argue that the
whipsaw phenomenon is also unfair because later-settling defendants
55
pay more than their proportional share of the damages. Payment
50. Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1294.
51. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 15 (“Thus, a competition develops
among defendants to settle early in the case, when plaintiffs need money and settlements are
cheap, which reduces the pool of remaining defendants and thereby further fuels the impetus to
settle quickly.”); C. Douglas Floyd, Contribution Among Antitrust Violators: A Question of
Legal Process, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REV. 183, 188; Jonathan M. Jacobson, Contribution Among
Antitrust Defendants: A Necessary Solution to a Recurring Problem, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 217, 221
(1980); Riemer, supra note 7, at 293–94 (discussing Corrugated Container and pointing out that
“[t]he settlement pressures were said to be so great that twenty-three defendants paid an
amount of almost $300 million during a one-month settlement ‘stampede’” (citing In re
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 84 F.R.D. 40, 41 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff’d, 606 F.2d 319 (5th
Cir. 1979))); Panic Aided Record Box Settlements, LEGAL TIMES (Wash., D.C.), May 7, 1979, at
1.
52. The term “majority” here means that the settling defendants were responsible for the
majority of the alleged cartel’s market share.
53. E.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 84 F.R.D. at 41.
54. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 15 (“Towards the end of this settlement
process, proponents claim, the few remaining defendants face potential liabilities so large that
they cannot afford to take the risk of going to trial and losing, even if justifiably convinced that
they are innocent of any wrongdoing.”).
55. See, e.g., Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 134 (statement of
Robert P. Taylor, Esq., Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro) (“I strongly believe that any rational legal
system must distribute liability on some basis among all those who are responsible for it. It is
manifestly unfair to require one company arbitrarily to shoulder the entire burden of
compensating a plaintiff, while other equally responsible and perhaps more culpable companies
are required to pay nothing in compensation of the plaintiff.”); id. at 285 (statement of Hon.
Barbara Jordan); A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 13–14 (“Under the present law,
it is possible for some violators to escape liability fully, by not being sued, or partially, by getting
so-called ‘sweetheart settlements.’ Proponents of contribution legislation contend that this is
also unfair.”); John Cirace, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Contribution and Claim Reduction in
Antitrust Treble Damage Suits, 55 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 42, 45 (1980) (“In general, whenever a
defendant settles with the plaintiff for a sum less than three times the damages attributable to its
acts, each remaining defendant faces an increased risk that it will be forced to bear more than its
proportionate share of the damages.”); Jacobson, supra note 51, at 233 (“But is it fair to compel
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size risks becoming a function of settlement order instead of relative
56
57
culpability or market share. Some observers suggest that unfairly
58
high payments for late-settling antitrust defendants are common.
The unfairness is magnified by the fact that the plaintiff can decide
which alleged conspirator it would like in the vulnerable last position.
The plaintiff can base its selection on any rationale, whim, or spite.
The plaintiff may show leniency or grant a complete pass to one or
more of the price-fixing firms—for example, because the plaintiff
59
buys directly from them and wants to maintain good relations,
60
because the plaintiff is related to them, because the plaintiff is trying
to simplify and speed up the litigation by suing the smallest
61
conspirator capable of paying the total damages, or for no reason at

Olson Farms to pay three times the damage caused by the entire conspiracy when it was
responsible for only eleven percent? Clearly not.”).
56. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997,
1995 WL 221853, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 1995) (mem.) (“The relative culpability of the
defendant is no longer pertinent. Instead, a sort of ‘game theory’ element emerges.”);
Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1290 (“The lack of contribution in antitrust cases permits the
utilization of whipsaw tactics that result in defendants paying settlement amounts bearing no
reasonable relationship to their degree of culpability or their benefits from the conspiracy.”).
57. See Note, supra note 15, at 907 (“Defendants who settle early in the whipsaw usually
pay far less than their share of the trebled liability—whether computed according to market
shares or on some other basis—and non-settling defendants remain liable for the difference.”
(footnote omitted)).
58. See Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 38 (statement of Denis
McInerney, Esq., Cahill, Gordon & Reindel) (“Consequently, it has become commonplace for
late-settling defendants to be forced to contribute to settlements in amounts wholly
disproportionate to their percentage of the questioned sales . . . .”).
59. See Prof’l Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Nat’l Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir.
1979) (“This possibility [of escaping all liability] significantly increases where a large or
powerful tortfeasor has sufficient economic influence to prevent a plaintiff from including it as a
defendant.”), abrogated by Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981);
Note, supra note 15, at 905–06 (citing the trial record in Cackling Acres, Inc. v. Olson Farms,
Inc., 541 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1976)).
60. See Note, supra note 15, at 905 n.77 (“The plaintiff may be a blood relative of one of
the potential defendants.” (citing Norfolk & S. R.R. v. Beskin, 125 S.E. 678 (Va. 1924))).
61. See Dickinson, supra note 20, at 165 n.180 (noting that the plaintiff’s strategy in Olson
Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 649 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1979), may have been “to obtain a
speedy recovery and avoid costly litigation with numerous defendants, [by having] the
plaintiff . . . select the smallest co-conspirator that in its estimation has sufficient assets to pay
the potential judgment and file suit naming only that party as a defendant”). The court,
however, did not acknowledge this point. See Olson Farms, 649 F.2d at 1380 (Holloway, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“We do not have a record or evidence in the instant
case indicating the reasons why Olson Farms was sued and the defendants-appellees were
ignored.”).
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all. Indeed, the plaintiff could decide to sue just one member of the
cartel and to hold that firm liable for trebled damages on the total
62
injuries inflicted by the entire cartel. While rare, plaintiffs have sued
63
only one alleged conspirator on occasion. Some see injustice in
granting so much power to an antitrust plaintiff in high-stakes
64
litigation.
Critics of the no-contribution regime suspect that antitrust
plaintiffs are abusing their power to select the initial defendants and
the settlement order. They hypothesize three distasteful scenarios.
First, contribution proponents assert that plaintiffs make sweetheart
deals with the most culpable defendant or defendants. Some
commentators assert that, in determining the order of settlements, an
antitrust
plaintiff will naturally look to those defendants that it perceives to
be the most in need of obtaining a release from the action. Often
these will be defendants that are potentially liable for a
proportionately large share of the total damages and are thus quite
65
anxious to limit their exposure through settlement.

Under this thinking, the most culpable defendant may feel uniquely
66
vulnerable and thus seek out an early settlement.

62. See, e.g., Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 8 (9th Cir. 1963)
(“A plaintiff need not sue all conspirators; he may choose to sue but one.”).
63. The most famous instance is perhaps Olson Farms, in which the plaintiff sued only the
smallest egg buyer in an alleged buyers’ cartel and the defendant was held liable for damages far
in excess to its business relationship with the plaintiff. See Olson Farms, 649 F.2d at 1380
(Holloway, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64. See Prof’l Beauty Supply, 594 F.2d at 1185–86 (“There is an obvious lack of sense and
justice in a rule which permits the entire burden of restitution of a loss for which two parties are
responsible to be placed upon one alone because of the plaintiff’s whim or spite, or his collusion
with the other wrongdoer.”); Jacobson, supra note 51, at 238 (“It is unfair to allow plaintiffs to
single out one defendant to satisfy the liability of many. It is unfair to compel a single defendant
to pay treble damages for an entire industry’s liability. And it is unfair to force a defendant to
abandon its defense and settle simply because of the coercive impact of earlier settlements with
more culpable parties.”).
65. Dickinson, supra note 20, at 179; see also Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings,
supra note 25, at 1–2 (statement of Sen. Bayh, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“[W]e
have to be aware that in a large antitrust suit . . . a small or medium-sized company could easily
face legal responsibility on behalf of the entire industry . . . while larger, more culpable
businesses go relatively free . . . .”).
66. See Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings, supra note 25, at 36–37 (statement of
Sen. Bayh, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); id. at 67 (statement of Donald G. Kempf, Jr.).
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Second, commentators assert that antitrust plaintiffs can exploit
the whipsaw threat to coerce large settlements out of innocent
67
defendants. They argue that even defendants acquitted of criminal
price-fixing may nonetheless feel pressured to settle follow-on private
68
civil lawsuits. Supporters of contribution rights assert that
defendants who maintain their innocence “have, as a practical matter,
69
been forced to settle without regard to liability or damage caused.”
Third, the absence of contribution might be particularly unfair to
small players with lower market shares because, according to some
commentators, antitrust plaintiffs do not offer them the same
70
favorable terms offered to cartel ringleaders. The most extreme
example of this phenomenon occurs when the plaintiff brings suit
against only one small defendant in lieu of suing any of the larger
71
potential defendants. Because the whipsaw creates the potential for
crippling liability should the plaintiff prevail, even a minor player in
the cartel may consent to a significant settlement to avoid the risk of
being held liable for three times the amount of all of the injury caused
72
by the cartel. Characterizing such settlement pressure on small

67. See, e.g., Note, supra note 15, at 907–10.
68. See, e.g., Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1290. This does not seem particularly surprising
given that the plaintiff’s burden of proof in private litigation is lower than the government’s in a
criminal prosecution. Also, new evidence may have come to light between the criminal and civil
proceedings. For example, Cargill, a provider of food and agricultural products, escaped
criminal liability for its participation in the citric acid price-fixing conspiracy because definite
evidence came to light too late. Compare In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1106 (9th Cir.
1999) (noting that the government declined to prosecute Cargill and affirming summary
judgment for Cargill in a follow-on civil suit), with David Barboza, Archer Daniels Executive
Said To Tell of Price-Fixing Talks with Cargill Counterpart, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1999, at C6
(showing that Cargill participated in a price-fixing conspiracy).
69. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, app. A at 53 (Report of the Section on
Proposed Amendment of the Clayton Act to Permit Contribution in Damage Actions); see also
Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings, supra note 25, at 66–67 (statement of Donald G.
Kempf, Jr.) (“The fact of the matter is that today antitrust settlements are being entered into
which bear no necessary relationship to whether or not the defendants engaged in any improper
conduct or whether or not the plaintiffs suffered any damage.”).
70. See Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1290.
71. See Note, supra note 15, at 908 (“By the latter stages of the whipsaw, a company
directly responsible for only a small fraction of a plaintiff’s damages may alone face liability for
damages caused by an entire industry.”); see also, e.g., id. at 904 (“Although Olson Farms was
the smallest of the price-fixers by sales, the plaintiffs sued that company alone for treble
damages. The judgment Olson Farms eventually paid amounted to twenty-four times the
damages immediately caused by the company’s egg purchases.”).
72. See id. at 906.
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players as fundamentally unfair, some commentators advocate
contribution among price-fixing defendants, whether by statute or by
73
contract.
A JSA ameliorates the whipsaw threat. Because JSAs
theoretically make each defendant responsible only for the
overcharges on its own sales, early settlements made by some
defendants do not create additional pressure on the remaining
defendants to settle on onerous terms. Courts have approved
judgment-sharing agreements as a mechanism to “minimize the
likelihood of these coercive settlements by equitably apportioning
74
any judgment that might be entered against the defendants.” The
Manual for Complex Litigation endorses JSAs because they “serve
the legitimate purposes of controlling parties’ exposure and
preventing plaintiffs from forcing an unfair settlement by threats to
show favoritism in the collection of any judgment that may be
75
recovered.” With a JSA in place, antitrust plaintiffs will not
generally be able to successfully employ the whipsaw strategy to
76
pressure price-fixing defendants to settle. Even those opposed to
amending the Sherman Act to allow contribution in antitrust cases
point to JSAs as a mechanism to solve the whipsaw problem without
77
creating a broad statutory right to contribution.
B. Benefits for Antitrust Enforcement: Deterrence and
Overdeterrence
In addition to fairness arguments, JSA supporters argue that
these contracts could also serve the goals of antitrust policy by
enhancing deterrence and diminishing the risk of overdeterrence.
Most of the antitrust contribution debate in the post–Texas Industries
era focused on whether a right to contribution would enhance or

73. See, e.g., A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 20–23.
74. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997, 1995
WL 221853, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 1995) (mem.).
75. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 22, § 13.23.
76. Cf. Note, supra note 15, at 910 (discussing how a contribution rule would reduce
whipsawing).
77. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, app. A at 68 (Minority Report on
Contribution) (“If plaintiffs truly are using their leverage arising from defendants’ joint and
several liability in an abusive manner, defendants already have at their disposal the weapon
needed to redress the imbalance. Sharing agreements, enthusiastically endorsed in the Majority
Report, can provide desired protection and without creating disabling uncertainty.”).
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inhibit deterrence of illegal price fixing. The procontribution camp
argued that contribution would better deter firms from joining pricefixing conspiracies. Because JSAs are essentially contribution by
contract, their rationales apply in large part to JSAs as well.
Proponents of contribution in antitrust have advanced two
related deterrence arguments in support of creating a right to
contribution among price-fixing defendants. First, they argue that a
right to contribution increases the probability that each cartel
78
participant will pay antitrust damages. The absence of contribution
is said to reduce deterrence because some conspirators can escape
79
liability. For example, in Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National
80
Beauty Supply, Inc., the only antitrust case to actually recognize a
right to contribution, the Eighth Circuit asserted,
[O]n balance a rule allowing contribution is actually a greater
deterrent. The fact that one tortfeasor may be held liable for all the
damages arising from the antitrust violation necessarily means that
other joint tortfeasors may go “scot free”. This possibility of escaping all liability might cause many to be more willing, rather than
less willing, to engage in wrongful activity.
. . . To deny contribution would be to dilute the deterrent effect
of the antitrust laws, since a participant in an antitrust violation
81
could escape all responsibility for its wrongdoing.

This position assumes that the greater certainty of some
punishment necessarily increases deterrence. Applying this
procontribution argument to JSAs, some commentators have argued
that JSAs should not reduce deterrence of price fixing because each
alleged conspirator faces a greater probability of having to pay
82
something. So long as any defendant is found liable, no signatory to

78. Dickinson, supra note 20, at 187–90.
79. See Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings, supra note 25, at 69 (statement of
Donald G. Kempf, Jr.) (“[Contribution] improves the deterrent force of our price-fixing laws.
Violators will not go unpunished, as they can now.”).
80. Prof’l Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Nat’l Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979),
abrogated by Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
81. Id. at 1185.
82. See, e.g., Riemer, supra note 7, at 312 (“Risk-neutral potential violators are unlikely to
be less deterred under a sharing agreement because the resulting reduced amount of potential
liability is offset by the increased probability of having to make at least some payments.”).
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the JSAs can escape payment. The increased probability of payment
83
increases deterrence, according to this theory.
Second, some contribution proponents assert that antitrust
deterrence does not depend on joint and several liability without
contribution. Rather, they argue that the mandatory trebling of
84
antitrust damages sufficiently deters price-fixing conspiracies.
Further, criminal sanctions—including nine-figure fines and
imprisonment—dissuade firms from price fixing. Indeed, some
commentators assert that in light of criminal penalties, “it is very
unlikely that the management of any company is making such [cost85
benefit] analysis” as to whether to join a price-fixing cartel. In sum,
because the combined threats of criminal liability and treble-damage
private suits deter cartelization, allowing contribution should not
86
reduce deterrence. By extension, allowing price-fixing defendants to
allocate responsibility through private JSAs should not detract from
the primary deterrents of antitrust conspiracies.
Beyond arguing that contribution would not undermine
antitrust’s deterrence goal, some proponents argue that the absence
of contribution, combined with joint and several liability, creates a
87
risk of overdeterrence because the prospect of high damages might
convince a company not to undertake arrangements that would be

83. See S. REP. NO. 96-428, at 9 (1979) (“[I]n a regulatory scheme, where one of the goals is
to deter destructive or illegal behavior, the best way to do so is to require that all of those
responsible for the wrong pay their part of the liability. This ensures that no one gets out of the
suit without paying for the wrong committed.”).
84. See, e.g., Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 233 (letter from Hon.
Charles B. Renfrew, Esq., Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, to members of the H. Subcomm. on
Monopolies and Commercial Law).
85. Id. at 47 (statement of Thomas R. Long).
86. See id. at 118 (statement of Donald T. Hibner, Jr.) (“Most businessmen are not aware
of contribution or noncontribution. What is a deterrent, and what they know about, are treble
damages, fines, imprisonment, and class actions.”); A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6,
at 24–25 (“Proponents also claim that the threat of criminal liability and to a lesser extent treble
damages, not joint and several liability, are the true deterrents to price fixing and other
anticompetitive activity. As one attorney testified, ‘[a]ny corporate executive foolish enough to
engage in such activities in the face of those risks would hardly be deterred by the lack of a
contribution statute.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings,
supra note 25, at 39 (statement of Denis McInerney, Esq., Cahill, Gordon & Reindel))).
87. See A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 25 (“[P]roponents claim that joint
and several liability can overdeter conduct which is subject to antitrust scrutiny but may be
procompetitive or competitively neutral.”); A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 8, at 30–35,
40–44.
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88

legal and procompetitive. Federal courts have long recognized the
89
risk that antitrust laws might overdeter legitimate business behavior.
Even though the Supreme Court declined to recognize a right to
contribution
among
antitrust
defendants,
it
nonetheless
acknowledged that “any discussion of this problem must consider the
problem of ‘overdeterrence,’ i.e., the possibility that severe antitrust
90
penalties will chill wholly legitimate business agreements.”
According to this view, fear of antitrust liability could deter firms
from pursuing efficient collaborations, such as distributional joint
ventures. Because a JSA could prevent overdeterrence by minimizing
the maximum amount of damages if such a collaboration were found
to be an antitrust violation, JSAs might facilitate a more efficient
antitrust regime.
Finally, some assert that the no-contribution rule increases the
likelihood that price-fixing litigation will force a defendant to declare
bankruptcy and exit the market, which would reduce competition in
the market. In the absence of JSAs, joint and several liability creates
a risk of bankruptcy when there is one holdout defendant or, perhaps,
when the plaintiff sues only one defendant. Some courts have noted
the bankruptcy risk, especially given the automatic trebling of
91
antitrust damages. To the extent that JSAs prevent any one firm in a
concentrated industry from getting hit with an antitrust damage
award that would force the firm from the market, JSAs can increase
competition, so the reasoning goes.

88. See Note, supra note 15, at 911 (“Excessive penalties can cause businesses to shun
competitive practices lying close to the borderline of impermissible conduct . . . for example . . .
refus[ing] to release price information for fear that it may be interpreted as price-fixing.”).
89. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 (1978) (“[There exists]
the distinct possibility of overdeterrence; salutary and procompetitive conduct lying close to the
borderline of impermissible conduct might be shunned by businessmen who chose to be
excessively cautious in the face of uncertainty regarding possible exposure to criminal
punishment for even a good-faith error of judgment.”); see also S. REP. NO. 96-428, at 18 (1979).
90. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 636–37 (1981) (citing U.S.
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 441–42).
91. See, e.g., Arth Main St. Drugs v. Beer Distribs. of Ind., Inc., No. F 77-73, 1978 WL 1357,
at *3 (N.D. Ind. June 8, 1978) (mem.) (asserting that the treble damages could bankrupt
antitrust defendants); see also Edward D. Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages: An Idea
Whose Time Has Come?, 61 TUL. L. REV. 777, 793 (1987) (“Where actual damages are high,
mandatory trebling may impair a firm’s ability to compete after judgment.”).
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III. THE CASE AGAINST JUDGMENT-SHARING AGREEMENTS
Although JSAs may seem like a reasonable way for defendants
to manage litigation costs, they also present many anticompetitive
dangers. First, JSAs may interfere with the settlement process in a
manner that reduces deterrence of price fixing. Second, JSAs may
help price-fixing firms conceal an illegal conspiracy. Third, JSAs may
represent a cartel-stabilizing device by solving one of the collective
action problems associated with illegal price-fixing. As a result, JSAs
may have the net effect of undermining cartel deterrence and
facilitating price-fixing conspiracies.
A. Judgment-Sharing Agreements Distort the Settlement Process
In general, antitrust law favors settlement. The Supreme Court
has opined that policies that promote settlement are “most consistent
with the aims and purposes of the treble damage remedy under the
92
antitrust laws.” Not only do settlements conserve judicial resources
93
by avoiding expensive trials, but if “settlements are discouraged, it
may be more difficult for plaintiffs to bring meritorious claims, obtain
94
redress for consumers, and deter unlawful behavior.” Not all
settlements, though, help achieve antitrust’s twin goals of
compensation and deterrence; the terms matter. As Professors
Easterbrook, Landes, and Posner have recognized, “settlement terms,
no less than damages awarded in litigated cases, determine the
95
deterrent effect of antitrust rules.” If particular rules systematically
reduce settlement amounts below their optimal level, deterrence
suffers.
Although some have suggested that JSAs should not affect
96
settlement amounts, that conclusion is logically suspect for several
reasons. First, absent a JSA, the race to settle early should increase

92. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 346 (1971).
93. See Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 19 (statement of Stephen
D. Susman, Esq., Susman & McGowan).
94. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 39.
95. Frank H. Easterbrook, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Contribution Among
Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J.L. & ECON. 331, 354 (1980).
96. E.g., Riemer, supra note 7, at 315 (“[T]he fact that sharing agreements affect the terms
of settlements is irrelevant to the goal of compensation. These agreements may affect the
ultimate apportionment of a judgment among defendants, but they do not, in any way, cause a
reduction in the amount of the judgment that a plaintiff can recover.” (footnotes omitted)).
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settlement values as defendants compete against each other to exit
97
the litigation. A shrewd antitrust plaintiff can play two or more
defendants against each other, essentially having the defendants bid
for the prize of settling first and avoiding both trial and the end of the
98
whipsaw. In the absence of contribution, joint and several liability
means that the expected cost of losing at trial is greater. This should
increase the reservation price that a defendant is willing to pay to
avoid the risk of trial. The no-contribution rule encourages settlement
because defendants are willing to pay dearly to avoid the risk of a
greater payout should they lose at trial. In contrast, a JSA may
prevent co-conspirators from bidding against each other in
99
negotiations with the plaintiff. Indeed, the reason that most
100
defendants enter into JSAs is to avert any “rush to settlement.” By
eliminating the risk of the whipsaw, JSAs reduce firms’ incentives to
101
settle private antitrust litigation. Indeed, this is the entire theory
behind the unfairness arguments in favor of creating contribution
rights for defendants in price-fixing cases. As a result, JSAs likely
depress settlement amounts.
Second, the primary justification for JSAs is to prevent the socalled whipsaw effect. The whipsaw allegedly coerces defendants into
paying larger settlements than they otherwise would. To the extent
that JSAs successfully prevent this whipsaw, they reduce the
plaintiff’s leverage and should consequently reduce the aggregate
102
settlements received by antitrust plaintiffs. Indeed, some courts

97. See Easterbrook et al., supra note 95, at 365 (“A rule of no contribution creates
competition among defendants to settle rather than litigate. Each defendant dreads being the
last to settle, because every time one defendant settles the expected liability of the remainder
increases. The plaintiff can use this fear to obtain a larger aggregate settlement under a nocontribution rule than he could expect to obtain if all of the defendants litigated.”).
98. See A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 40 (“Economic analysis suggests that
the rule of no contribution produces higher aggregate settlements by fostering competition
among defendants to settle early.”).
99. See DAVID BOIES, COURTING JUSTICE 320–54 (2004) (discussing the auction houses
price-fixing class action lawsuit).
100. Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1327 n.271 (“[I]n the In re Antibiotics Antitrust Cases, the
five defendants entered into a sharing agreement and thereby avoided any ‘rush to
settlement.’”).
101. See Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings, supra note 25, at 94–96 (testimony of
Harold Kohn, Attorney).
102. See Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 237 (testimony of William
W. Schwarzer, J., Northern District of California) (“I think that it is probably true that the cases
would be settled at lower amounts than now because of the decline in the plaintiff’s leverage.”).
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have praised JSAs precisely for “discouraging coerced settlements.”
Yet if each defendant is paying a smaller individual settlement, then
the aggregate settlement amount must also be lower. Consistency
precludes JSA proponents from praising the settling-reducing effects
of JSAs while simultaneously purporting that JSAs should not affect
settlement amounts.
Third, a JSA can reduce the value of early settlements because
JSAs sometimes require any settling defendant to negotiate a term in
its settlement agreement whereby the plaintiff agrees “not to seek
damages from nonsettling defendants attributable to the settling
104
defendants’ sales.” The settling defendant must ensure that the final
settlement with the plaintiff includes such a carve-out provision
because if it does not, then the other signatories have a contractual
right to sue the settling defendant for contribution as described in the
105
JSA. By forcing the settling defendant to include this carve-out
provision, the JSA ensures that the other settling defendants will not
be liable for the settling defendant’s overcharges. The plaintiff must
disclaim any further interest in the settling defendant’s overcharges,
whereas under ordinary joint and several liability, the plaintiff would
still be able to collect from the nonsettling defendants the difference
between the settling defendant’s overcharges (trebled) and the
settlement amount. Thus, JSA carve-out provisions decrease the
value of the overall litigation to an antitrust plaintiff by preventing
the plaintiff from factoring the settling defendant’s overcharges into
damage awards against the co-conspirators. In essence, these JSA
106
provisions eliminate joint and several liability.

103. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997, 1995
WL 221853, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 1995) (mem.).
104. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 19; see also Antitrust Damage Allocation
Hearings, supra note 25, at 142 (statement of Robert P. Taylor, Esq., Pillsbury, Madison &
Sutro) (“Although diverse, such agreements typically apportion liability under some agreedupon formula, often market share, and provide that if any signatory defendant settles it must
require the plaintiff to reduce any judgment obtained against the other signatories by the
settling defendant’s percentage share under the agreement or alternatively to remain
contractually responsible to the other signatories for any difference.”).
105. Riemer, supra note 7, at 306 (“[B]ecause a settling defendant is relieved of liability to
the non-settling defendants only if the settlement agreement contains a claim reduction or
carve-out provision, defendants will have little incentive to settle unless plaintiffs agree to such a
provision.” (footnote omitted)).
106. See S. REP. NO. 96-428, at 36 (1979) (supplemental views of Sen. Metzenbaum & Sen.
Kennedy).
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In addition to diminishing the value of settlements, JSAs reduce
the probability of settlement for two reasons. First, JSAs reduce the
defendants’ incentive to settle by significantly limiting each
defendant’s potential exposure. As Judge Hubert Will noted in his
Congressional testimony, contribution in antitrust cases would
“substantially deter settlements because it would reduce the
defendant’s risks, and anything that reduces his risks reduces the
107
incentive to settle.” Second, JSAs can complicate the settlement
process because the settling defendant has to negotiate to protect the
nonsettling defendants. As noted, JSAs sometimes “contain
provisions requiring a settling defendant to extract an agreement
from the plaintiff to reduce its claims against the nonsettling
defendants by the amount of damages for which the settling
108
defendant would have been responsible absent any settlement.”
Antitrust practitioners have long recognized that a defendant
seriously interested in settling has a better chance for success by
going it alone. Besides being able to plead its own cause most
effectively, it can avoid the quagmire of the conflicting interests of
its fellow bargainer-competitors, and gain a possible competitive
advantage by either early settlement or by settlement on its own
109
terms.

Even a price-fixing defendant that strongly prefers settlement may be
unable to offer a deal that satisfies both the terms of the JSA and the
110
needs of the plaintiff. Although settlements still happen with

107. Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 270 (testimony of Hubert L.
Will, J., Northern District of Illinois).
108. Mark D. Plevin, Avoiding Problems in Joint Defense Groups, 23 LITIGATION 41, 44
(1996); see also Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 7 (statement of A.
Stephens Clay, Esq., Kilpatrick & Cody) (“Such an agreement provides, among other things,
that no defendant will settle unless the plaintiffs surrender their claim for damages attributable
to that defendant’s sales.”); Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings, supra note 25, at 121
(statement of Donald T. Hiber) (“If a defendant settles, he must insure that the plaintiffs will
not seek recovery from others based upon alleged overcharges on the settling defendant’s sales.
If the settling defendant does not ‘remove his sales from suit’ he will be liable to the remaining
defendants.”).
109. H. Robert Halper, The Unsettling Problems of Settlement in Antitrust Damage Cases, 32
ANTITRUST L.J. 98, 99–100 (1966).
110. Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 93 (statement of Harold E.
Kohn, Esq., Kohn, Savett, Marion & Graf, P.C.) (stating that contribution rights among
antitrust defendants would “in many instances” make settlement “impossible”).
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111

JSAs, anecdotal evidence suggests that signatories to a sharing
112
agreement may be less likely to settle than nonsignatories.
Despite such reasoning and evidence, courts have rejected
arguments that JSAs improperly reduce the incentive for settlement.
For example, the district judge in one case, Cimarron Pipeline
113
Construction v. National Council on Compensation Insurance,
agreed with the defendants’ position “that the sharing agreement
does not disrupt the settlement process and in fact makes the
settlement negotiations more equitable by alleviating the need for a
party to settle merely to avoid the sometimes disastrous costs of
114
extensive litigation.” The court’s reasoning proves the opposite
point: by minimizing the threat of litigation, JSAs reduce the
defendants’ incentive to settle with the plaintiff. That reduction of
pressure may be good or bad depending on one’s perspective, but it
exists. The court stood on firmer ground when it noted that the
plaintiffs in the case had “in fact reached settlement agreements with
115
over 60 percent of the signatories to the sharing agreement.” But
the argument is not that JSAs make settlement impossible; rather,
JSAs make settlements harder to reach and may reduce settlement
116
values for the plaintiff.
Finally, by reducing the likelihood of early settlements, JSAs
may interfere with the funding and evidence-gathering processes of
legitimate antitrust cases. First, JSAs may hinder victims of pricefixing conspiracies from successfully litigating their claims by
interfering with the financing of antitrust lawsuits. Small plaintiffs

111. See S. REP. NO. 96-428, at 25.
112. See, e.g., Cimarron Pipeline Constr. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., Nos. CIV-89-822-T,
CIV-89-1886-T, 1992 WL 350612, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 10, 1992).
Indeed, one of the purported justifications for JSAs is that they forestall settlements. For
example, one source argues that “a judgment-sharing agreement may be appropriate where
there is a meritorious defense and the defendants want to make sure that none of the other
defendants settle.” Edward D. Cavanagh, Antitust, 5 BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION
IN FEDERAL COURTS § 61, § 61.7 (Robert L. Haig ed., 2d ed. 2008). While Professor Cavanaugh
supports JSAs when the defendants have a meritorious defense, the settlement-precluding effect
of a JSA exists regardless of whether the defendants have a meritorious defense.
113. Cimarron Pipeline Constr. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., Nos. CIV-89-822-T, CIV-89886-T, 1992 WL 350612 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 10, 1992).
114. Id. at *3.
115. Id.
116. See Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 94–95 (statement of
Harold E. Kohn, Esq., Kohn, Savett, Marion & Graf).
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that pursue antitrust claims are less successful than larger plaintiffs.
One reason may be that antitrust litigation is expensive and only
plaintiffs with sufficiently deep pockets can persevere. Absent
financing, many plaintiffs cannot survive the war of attrition that is
118
antitrust litigation. Plaintiffs often rely on partial, incremental
119
settlements to fund the litigation against the remaining defendants.
By impeding this funding mechanism, JSAs might deter or derail
120
legitimate suits.
Second, early settling defendants often provide critical evidence
to support the plaintiff’s claims. Although some may argue that many
private price-fixing lawsuits rely on successful previous government
actions that provide all of the necessary evidence to prove liability,
the evidence secured through discovery is important even in followon cases. First, in many cases, the private price-fixing lawsuit precedes
121
any government prosecution. Second, even when a private lawsuit
follows a successful government case, plaintiffs’ attorneys often need
122
more evidence than prosecutors have collected. For example,

117. Jeffrey M. Perloff, Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Paul Ruud, Antitrust Settlements and Trial
Outcomes, 78 REV. ECON. & STAT. 401, 407 (1996).
118. Joseph L. Alioto, The Economics of a Treble Damage Case, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 92
(1966) (“[A] war of attrition [is] carried on as an accepted method of defence by the large
defendants and their attorneys; any suggestion that the plaintiff may not be adequately financed
will result in stretching out the pretrial process by various devices.”).
119. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 22, § 13.21 (“Such partial settlements
may provide funds needed to pursue the litigation . . . .”); see also Antitrust Damage Allocation
Hearings, supra note 25, at 8 (statement of A. Stephens Clay, Esq., Kilpatrick & Cody) (“Partial
settlements, or settlements with fewer than all the defendants, have served as a crucial
preliminary step in achieving comprehensive settlements of complex antitrust litigation.”).
120. S. REP. NO. 96-428, at 40 (1979) (supplemental views of Sen. Metzenbaum & Sen.
Kennedy) (“Allowing contribution would discourage . . . settlements and make it much more
difficult for the plaintiff to ultimately prevail. The more difficulty the plaintiff faces, the less likely
such suits will be brought, the less likely plaintiffs will succeed, and the less likely would-be
violators will be deterred.” (alteration in the original) (quoting Alabama v. Bluebird Body Co.,
No. 75-23-N, slip op. at 5 (M.D. Ala. May 18, 1979))).
121. See, e.g., JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL PRICE FIXING 314 (2001) (“Boies & Schiller filed
a civil price-fixing suit in U.S. District Court in Dallas, Texas on behalf of several direct
purchasers of bulk vitamins in March 1998. It would be more than one year before the
government indicted Hoffmann-La Roche, BASF, and others for the same crimes.”).
122. See In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 84 F.R.D. 245, 266 (N.D. Ill. 1979)
(“Nonetheless, it can also be said that prior criminal proceedings are generally narrower in
scope than any civil action and helpful, from a discovery viewpoint, only in the beginning.
Where all or most of the defendants plead Nolo soon after indictments have been handed down,
government evidence gathering comes to a halt and the civil plaintiffs must do considerable
discovery work on their own.”).
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private price-fixing cases are often broader than government cases in
that private cases often allege that the price-fixing covered more
123
products over a longer time frame. In short, in many cases, “[t]he
only way the plaintiff can get evidence is to find someone involved in
the conspiracy who has nothing to lose, and in effect give them some
124
kind of informal immunity” in a settlement agreement.
Unfortunately, JSAs may undermine the evidence-gathering process,
as the following Section explains.
In sum, JSAs can reduce the amount that price-fixing defendants
pay in the aggregate. This can reduce the attractiveness of bringing
legitimate antitrust suits and could undermine deterrence of pricefixing conspiracies, as Part IV discusses.
B. Judgment-Sharing Agreements Can Help Conceal a Cartel
The first rule of cartel membership is “don’t get caught.” All
cartel members share a common interest in concealing their activities.
A price-fixing conspiracy exposed during private litigation can lead to
criminal prosecutions, possibly resulting in massive criminal fines
125
against cartel firms and prison time for the individuals involved.
Consequently, cartels go to great lengths to hide their crimes. Price
fixers employ code names, use public phones, falsify travel itineraries
126
when they meet with competitors,
and create shell trade
127
associations with fake agendas. In the aftermath of the electrical
equipment cartels, participants explained
123. See, e.g., id. at 252; see also ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON
CLASS ACTIONS § 18:57 (4th ed. 2002) (“Plaintiffs’ counsel will usually seek, initially at least, to
recover damages based on the entire alleged conspiracy period, when it is longer than four
years . . . .”).
124. Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 28 (statement of Stephen D.
Susman, Esq., Susman & McGowan).
125. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and,
on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or,
if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.”).
126. Gilbert Geis, White Collar Criminal: The Heavy Electrical Equipment Antitrust Case in
1961, in WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINAL 103, 107 (Gilbert Geis ed., 1968); see also, e.g., JAMES B.
LIEBER, RATS IN THE GRAIN: THE DIRTY TRICKS AND TRIALS OF ARCHER DANIELS
MIDLAND 221 (2000) (discussing the lysine cartel and measures taken to conceal the cartel).
127. John Gibeaut, Antitrust American Style, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2004, at 55, 58 (“Cartels are
especially hard to detect because members can reach secret agreements under the cover of
social connections, trade associations, mutual business contacts and other legitimate
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the techniques of concealment: “. . . to minimize telephone calls, to
use plain envelopes if mailing material to each other, not to be seen
together on traveling, and so forth. . . . not to leave wastepaper, of
128
which there was a lot, strewn around a room when leaving.”

And when price-fixing firms fear that the conspiracy may be exposed,
129
they often attempt to destroy all incriminating documents.
Although cartel rules commonly prohibit participants from
taking notes or documenting the price-fixing activity, cartels often
include an individual or two who disobeys the ban on record130
keeping. While individuals may keep notes for many reasons—such
as fastidiousness, or to hold cartel partners accountable should a
dispute among co-conspirators arise about the substance of earlier
agreements—the notes are often cashed in as makeshift insurance
131
policies when the cartel unravels. Participants in price-fixing cartels
routinely create incriminating documents but conceal them until it is
in their best interest to reveal them. For example, in the auctionhouse price-fixing cartel between Sotheby’s and Christie’s, the heads
of Sotheby’s (Dede Brooks) and Christie’s (Christopher Davidge)
fixed nonnegotiable sellers’ commissions and agreed to not
132
memorialize their illegal agreement in writing. Brooks honored
their agreement and believed that her partner in crime was abiding by
their agreement as well. She was wrong. Although Davidge did
respect his promise to fix commissions, unbeknownst to anyone else

circumstances.”).
128. Geis, supra note 126, at 107 (second alteration in original) (quoting Administered
Prices: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 87th Cong. pt. 27 (1961)).
129. See, e.g., LIEBER, supra note 126, at 155–56.
130. See Christopher R. Leslie, Cartels, Agency Costs, and Finding Virtue in Faithless Agents,
49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1621, 1641–48 (2008).
131. Cécile Aubert, Patrick Rey & William E. Kovacic, The Impact of Leniency and WhistleBlowing Programs on Cartels, 24 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1241, 1260 (2006) (explaining that cartel
members take notes because cartel “agreements may be very complex, due to the variety of
products and prices involved, and to the number of possible contingencies; limited memory may
then call for keeping notes about the agreement”); see also, e.g., CHRISTOPHER MASON, THE
ART OF THE STEAL 142 (2003) (describing a price fixer who “thought it wise to keep a record of
[price-fixing] discussions in case of any unforeseen repercussions”); Douglas Frantz, Private
Files Fuel an Art Auction Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2000, at A1 (describing notes that were
taken in the Christie’s case that were handed over to the Department of Justice).
132. MASON, supra note 131, at 140–41 (providing the entire series of events in the Christie’s
case in detail).
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he created copious notes after each illegal meeting. He documented
his one-on-one conversations with his boss, Anthony Tennant (the
CEO of Christie’s), his negotiations and agreements with Brooks, and
what Brooks had told him about her discussions with Alfred
Taubman (the CEO of Sotheby’s), whose meetings with Tennant had
134
set the cartel in motion. These notes were ultimately critical to
antitrust authorities securing guilty pleas by Sotheby’s and Christie’s
and a criminal conviction of Taubman, who was sentenced to a year
135
and a day in federal prison, and fined $7.5 million. In short,
evidence of illegal price-fixing often exists; the difficulty is uncovering
it.
Prior to any settlements, codefendants in many types of litigation
share an incentive to conceal evidence of price fixing. In general, the
plaintiff’s failure to discover all relevant evidence from the
defendants before settling remains a significant problem in civil
136
litigation. The incentive to conceal bad evidence is compounded in
price-fixing cases because a diligent private plaintiff can expose a
criminal conspiracy that the government will later prosecute. Thus, it
is hardly surprising that antitrust defendants fail to produce
nonprivileged documents that are responsive to plaintiffs’ discovery
requests when the documents demonstrate the existence of a price137
fixing conspiracy. As a result, price fixers may escape liability
simply for the plaintiff’s want of evidence.
Settlements, however, can lead to the exposure of incriminating
evidence. Traditional settlements in price-fixing cases—without
JSAs—often require the settling defendants to assist plaintiffs with
138
discovery. In discussing settlements, plaintiffs’ attorneys in price139
fixing cases often seek evidence as much as money. Price fixers who
desire to minimize their monetary exposure are sometimes willing to

133. See id. at 142.
134. Id. at 2–3.
135. Id. at 360.
136. Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers’ Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal
Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787, 811–13.
137. See Alioto, supra note 118, at 92–93.
138. See, e.g., In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 296 F. Supp. 2d 568, 575 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
139. See, e.g., BOIES, supra note 99, at 340 (“After our meeting with the Christie’s lawyers,
Richard, Phil, and I sat down to try to structure a settlement offer that would induce Christie’s
to pay the class a substantial amount of money and, equally important, provide us with the
evidence we were missing to establish a buyers’ commission conspiracy.”).
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supply incriminating documents and even necessary testimony at trial
140
against their former cartel partners. The joint and several liability
allows plaintiffs to negotiate liability releases in exchange for
evidence. The first settler is often willing to supply inside evidence in
order to reduce its liability. The plaintiff is willing to accept this
reduced amount of money because the joint and several liability
means that the plaintiff can recover any foregone money from the
remaining defendants, against whom the plaintiff can make a better
case after receiving evidence from the first settler. Indeed, because
the nonsettling defendants remain liable for all of the damages, a
prudent price-fixing plaintiff may grant a settlement for little or no
money in exchange for incriminating evidence against its co141
conspirators. Furthermore, when early settlements have a money
component, they can fund the plaintiff’s continued evidence
142
gathering.
Although the whipsaw theory argues that “the plaintiff is able to
use the leverage provided by the increase in liability as a means to
143
coerce settlements from the remaining defendants,”
this
explanation fails to consider that the increased pressure may be
attributable, in part, to the increased strength of the plaintiff’s case on
the merits by the time that later settlements occur. Evidence secured
from early-settling defendants may increase the settlement payments
of later-settling defendants because the plaintiff’s case grows stronger
144
as the plaintiff accumulates more evidence. The increased pressure
to pay more money that later-settling defendants face is perfectly
legitimate to the extent that it derives from the plaintiff’s stronger
case.
Judgment-sharing agreements can undermine this evidenceproducing dynamic. In the presence of a JSA, a defendant who has
admissible proof of illegal activity—which it could use as leverage to

140. Id. at 340–41; Halper, supra note 109, at 113 n.25 (“[A settling antitrust] defendant
might agree to make specific information available, or allow plaintiff to interview its
employees.”).
141. BOIES, supra note 99, at 242 n.*.
142. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 22, § 13.21.
143. Dickinson, supra note 20, at 180–81.
144. This notion is consistent with the observation that “post discovery settlements are more
likely to reflect the true value of the claim and be fair.” Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d
581, 588 (3d Cir. 1999) (alteration omitted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1314
(3d Cir. 1993)).
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get itself a sweetheart deal in an early settlement—may have
insufficient incentive to share the information. Although any
settlement might reduce that individual defendant’s direct liability,
the evidence would lead to a greater probability of liability and higher
damages for the remaining defendants and that first-settling party
would bear a percentage of those damages pursuant to the terms of
145
the JSA. Discussing JSAs in the context of multidefendant tort
litigation, Professors Lisa Bernstein and Daniel Klerman explain that
JSAs
will affect the defendants’ trial strategy and their incentives to testify
in particular ways at trial. For example, in the absence of such an
agreement each defendant has an incentive to introduce evidence
tending to place responsibility for the plaintiff’s harm on other
defendants. In contrast, when a judgment-sharing agreement exists,
the defendants will try to show that none of them were at fault.
Finger pointing will be avoided, and it will be left to the plaintiff to
introduce all of the evidence against each defendant. Each
defendant will then have an incentive to testify in a way that
minimizes the defendants’ total expected liability. Because the
plaintiff will often have less information than each defendant about
the cause of his harm, these agreements may decrease the likelihood
146
that he will prevail.

Thus, critical evidence could be suppressed in cases in which the
defendants have entered into a JSA, as the only individuals who are
aware of the evidence have less incentive to share it with private
plaintiffs.
In sum, JSAs reduce incentives for co-conspirators to turn on
each other. Normally, once a price-fixing cartel has been exposed, the
best way to reduce one’s individual liability is to present evidence that
shifts the blame to other members of the cartel. This is often done in
the context of a settlement whereby the settling firm agrees to
provide evidence against its former co-conspirators in exchange for a
relatively low settlement amount. With a JSA in place, there is
145. See Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 51 (statement of John F.
Seiberling, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“[F]rom the practical standpoint of a
plaintiff’s lawyer, it is going to be extremely difficult for him to proceed to collect evidence if
everyone is liable for his pro rata share.”); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 22,
§ 13.23 (“[Sharing agreements] also create a disincentive for defendants to make available
evidence indicating liability on the part of codefendants.”).
146. Bernstein & Klerman, supra note 23, at 2270 n.149.
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significantly less incentive to engage in such finger pointing—after all,
increasing the damages paid by one’s former cartel partners may
increase the amount of money that the finger-pointer will eventually
have to pay out pursuant to the JSA. In the absence of a JSA, each
individual defendant has an overriding incentive to reduce its own
exposure, regardless of the penalties paid by its co-conspirators.
Indeed, because the other defendants are its competitors, it may
benefit from a disproportionately low damage assessment because its
competitors may have to charge a greater amount of money for their
products in the future in order to recoup their higher damages. The
JSA, however, shifts incentives, reduces the benefits of individual
settlement, and thus reduces the pressure to expose cartel activity.
C. Judgment-Sharing Agreements as a Solution to the Prisoner’s
Dilemma
Game theory illustrates how JSAs may stabilize price-fixing
conspiracies and foster the concealment of cartel activity. Price-fixing
conspiracies present many instances of prisoner’s dilemmas.
1. The Prisoner’s Dilemma. The prisoner’s dilemma is a game
theory model based on two criminals who have committed a major
crime and a minor crime. The police have sufficient evidence to
convict both for the minor crime, but not enough to sustain
convictions of either for the major crime. The police interrogate both
suspects independently about their roles in the major crime but
neither has confessed. The confession of either would be enough to
convict the other of the major crime. Because the police want to
convict at least one—and ideally both—of the prisoners for the major
crime, they offer each the same deal: “If you confess and provide
evidence against your partner, then you’ll get no jail time for either
the minor or major crime and he’ll get a three-year sentence; if he
confesses and you don’t, you’ll get the three-year sentence and he’ll
walk. But, if both of you confess, we won’t need your testimony and
both of you will get a two-year sentence. Finally, if neither of you
confesses, then you’ll each get one year in prison on the minor crime.
Your partner is being offered the same deal.”
The offered deal is commonly depicted by the following matrix,
which shows the payoff in jail time to each prisoner under each
scenario:
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Basic Prisoner’s Dilemma Matrix
A
Don’t
Confess

B Don’t
Confess

Confess
1

1
Confess

0
3

3
0

2
2

Under this scheme, prisoners pursuing their own short-term self
interest should confess. From Prisoner A’s perspective, if Prisoner B
confesses, then Prisoner A can either confess and receive two years in
prison or not confess and receive three years in prison. Framed in this
manner, Prisoner A should confess in order to receive less time in
prison. Conversely, if Prisoner B does not confess, then Prisoner A
can either remain quiet and thus receive one year in prison on the
minor crime or can confess and avoid imprisonment altogether. In
this situation, Prisoner A should confess because no prison time is
preferred over one year in prison. Thus, if Prisoner B confesses,
Prisoner A is better off confessing, and if Prisoner B does not confess,
Prisoner A is still better off confessing. This makes confession a
dominant strategy because Prisoner A is better off confessing
147
regardless of what Prisoner B does.
Prosecutors, however, have offered Prisoner B the same deal
and, similarly, confession is Prisoner B’s dominant strategy as well. If
each prisoner pursues this dominant strategy and confesses, then both
prisoners will receive two years in prison for the major crime. If the
prisoners were to cooperate and neither were to confess, then each
would receive only a one-year prison sentence for the minor crime.
This means that the mutual pursuit of the dominant strategy results in
147. A dominant strategy exists if a player is better off picking a particular option regardless
of which course the player’s partner selects. Conversely, if a player could be better off changing
the decision after learning the player’s partner’s choice, then no choice dominates the other
under all circumstances and there is no dominant strategy and no true prisoner’s dilemma.
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a Pareto-inferior outcome because both prisoners could improve their
position if the two could shift from the Confess-Confess outcome
(two years in prison for each) to the Don’t Confess-Don’t Confess
outcome (one year in prison for each).
2. Cartels and the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Cartel relationships are
rife with prisoner’s dilemmas. The first, and most discussed, prisoner’s
dilemma in any cartel arrangement involves the incentive of pricefixing firms to cheat on their agreement by charging less than the
fixed price. Although the firms are better off as a group with a stable
cartel in which every firm charges the cartel-set price, each individual
firm maximizes its own short-term profits by reducing its price and
148
selling more than its cartel allotment. Such cheating can destabilize
a cartel, resulting in price wars in which all firms are worse off than if
every firm had abided by the cartel price. Cartel members also face
prisoner’s dilemmas when deciding whether to cooperate with either
a criminal antitrust prosecution or a civil price-fixing claim.
a. The Prisoner’s Dilemma and Prosecuting Cartels.
The
prisoner’s dilemma created by a criminal antitrust prosecution closely
mirrors the classic prisoner’s dilemma because it presents coconspirators the opportunity to gain leniency by confessing. The key
element in this dilemma is that antitrust authorities grant amnesty
from criminal prosecution to the first member of a cartel to confess.
The cartel members are better off as a group if they are silent (that is,
if nobody confesses in exchange for amnesty) because the conspiracy
remains hidden and they continue to make cartel profits. However,
the only way that an individual firm can be guaranteed that it will not
be criminally prosecuted is to be the first firm to confess. This can
149
create the dynamic of a prisoner’s dilemma.
In 1993, the DOJ’s Antitrust Division reformed its Corporate
Leniency Policy by making the process for awarding amnesty more
structured and less discretionary. Under the government’s revamped
Amnesty Program, the first confessor gets the best deal: no criminal
liability and, in subsequent private lawsuits, liability limited to single

148. Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 558 (2004).
149. Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability, 31 J.
CORP. L. 453, 465–66 (2006)
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damages for its own sales made at the cartel price. The second
confessor gets the second best deal: a significant reduction in criminal
fines (though no limitation on damages in follow-on private
litigation). Each successive confessing firm receives a smaller discount
151
off of its maximum criminal fine until every cartel member has
confessed (or faces a criminal trial with an almost certain outcome, as
the confessing cartel members must provide evidence against their
former partners).
The program has been wildly successful. The Amnesty Program
has been the “most effective generator of cartel cases and is believed
to be the most successful program in U.S. history for detecting large
152
commercial crimes.” Before the new program, the government
received one application per year from firms willing to expose a cartel
in exchange for leniency; after the change in policy, applications
153
increased to three per month. The Amnesty Program has led to the
exposure of international cartels in marine transportation services,
154
graphite electrodes, bromines, and vitamins, resulting in over one
155
billion dollars in fines. In short, the government has successfully
applied the insights of the prisoner’s dilemma in its Amnesty
Program.
Judgment-sharing agreements undermine the Amnesty Program.
One reason for a price-fixing firm to confess first is to get single
damages and avoid the whipsaw in civil litigation because the first
confessor is not liable for treble damages or any damages associated
with its co-conspirators’ sales regardless of whether that firm settles
any subsequent private suit based on cartel activity first, last, or not at
all. If a JSA eliminates the whipsaw, as claimed by its proponents, this
significantly reduces the incentive to confess first in order to secure
amnesty and resulting single damages. The Amnesty Program

150. 15 U.S.C. § 1 note (2006) (Antitrust Enforcement Enhancements and Cooperation
Incentives). In essence, the Amnesty Program eliminates both treble damages and joint and
several liability for the first firm to confess.
151. Late-confessing firms also generally must sacrifice at least one executive, who must
serve prison time. See Leslie, supra note 130, at 1660–61.
152. Gary R. Spratling, Detection and Deterrence: Rewarding Informants for Reporting
Violations, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 798, 799 (2001).
153. Kathryn K. Dyer & Garrett M. Liskey, Antitrust Violations, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 195,
224 (2008).
154. CONNOR, supra note 121, at 509.
155. Spratling, supra note 152, at 800.
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succeeds by rewarding the first-confessing firm in a manner that
creates distrust among cartel partners, as each must worry that one of
156
its co-conspirators may take the bait and confess first. Because the
costs of not confessing first are high, this creates distrust among the
cartel members. By decreasing (often significantly) the marginal gains
from confessing first, JSAs can moderate the distrust-creating effects
of the Amnesty Program. As a result, JSAs can weaken the
government’s most effective weapon for exposing, punishing, and
deterring price-fixing conspiracies.
b. The Prisoner’s Dilemma and Negotiating Private Settlements. In
addition to the cheating and confessing prisoner’s dilemmas, the
process of negotiating settlements in private antitrust litigation
against price fixers also represents a form of prisoner’s dilemma.
Settlement negotiations provide yet another instance in which each
firm must decide whether to maximize its individual short-term utility
or to stay loyal to the cartel. Early in the cartel’s life, firms may be
tempted to cheat or confess, but that temptation will be tempered by
the fact that a firm’s defection could cause the demise of a profitable
cartel. Once litigation has been filed, however, the cartel probably
cannot continue business as usual and the lure of future cartel profits
no longer figures as significantly into a firm’s decisionmaking calculus
on whether to share evidence of the cartel’s activities.
Nevertheless, the conspirators are generally better off as a group
if they present a united no-settlement front against the antitrust
plaintiff because none would fund the litigation or provide evidence
that can be used against the remaining defendants. Each individual
defendant, however, might perceive an advantage to striking a deal
and settling first, based on the assumption that the first-settling
defendant may receive the best deal. A so-called sweetheart
settlement—in which the first settling defendant trades evidence for a
lower settlement—is analogous to the prisoner’s dilemma model in
which the prosecutors reward confession by offering less prison time.
Firms may be worried that if they do not settle first, then one of
their former partners will strike a deal with the plaintiff. As discussed
above, settlement costs for holdout firms generally rise as their

156. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE: PERSPECTIVES AND
RESOURCES FOR CORPORATE COUNSELORS 49 (2005) (“This ‘winner-takes-all’ dynamic
generates tension and mistrust among cartel members.”).
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codefendants settle because the earlier settlers have provided both a
litigation war chest and (often) damning evidence. The plaintiff—now
armed with funds and evidence—poses a more credible threat to the
remaining defendants of going to trial and winning. In sum, each
defendant maximizes its utility by settling first, but the defendants as
a group do better if they negotiate as a group or decline to settle
157
altogether. This is a prisoner’s dilemma because the group as a
whole maximizes utility through mutual nonconfession, while each
individual profits most by confessing.
The most direct solution to the prisoner’s dilemma is an
enforceable contract in which the prisoners contractually bind
themselves not to confess or provide evidence against each other.
Any such contract between criminal defendants—such as the suspects
in the classic prisoner’s dilemma—would be unenforceable as a
matter of public policy. Judgment-sharing agreements, however, can
solve the prisoner’s dilemma by in essence committing the alleged coconspirators to a strategy of mutual nonconfession. The JSA helps
prevent the settlement race by allowing defendants to present a
united front against the plaintiff’s attempts to play co-conspirators
against each other. With a JSA in place, each firm has less to gain by
breaking ranks and settling. Although settling early would allow the
firm to avoid litigation costs, depending on the terms of the JSA, any
evidence that it provided as part of its settlement could increase the
amount of damages at trial, of which it would be responsible for a
percentage pursuant to the JSA.
In short, a JSA may be a mechanism for cartel discipline at the
settlement stage. Stable cartels require a minimal measure of
discipline whereby the cartel members do not pursue their own
individual interests—for example, by cutting price or exposing the
cartel to the government in exchange for leniency—at the expense of
their cartel partners. With each firm constraining its ability to trade
evidence for a sweetheart deal, the JSA makes all members of the
cartel better off. While a federal court would never countenance a
private contract among defendants to conceal evidence or to not
settle, the effect of such a forbidden contract may be achieved if
courts fail to appreciate the anticompetitive potential of JSAs.

157. See Cirace, supra note 55, at 54–55.
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IV. BALANCING THE UNFAIRNESS AND DETERRENCE
CONSIDERATIONS
Parts II and III present very different characterizations of
judgment-sharing agreements. The arguments in Part II see JSAs as
legitimate risk-spreading mechanisms that mitigate the unfairness of
the no-contribution regime in antitrust and may also increase
deterrence. Part III suggests that JSAs may help stabilize and conceal
cartels, which would necessarily reduce deterrence of price-fixing
activity, and may decrease the chance of successful litigation of
meritorious price-fixing claims, which could also reduce deterrence as
well as leave the cartel’s victims uncompensated. This Part weighs the
proffered fairness arguments and competing theories on deterrence
and concludes that JSAs probably have a net negative effect on cartel
deterrence.
A. Challenging the Unfairness Critique of the No-Contribution
Regime
Commentators defend JSAs as necessary to moderate the
unfairness of plaintiffs’ coercive whipsaw tactics. Although facially
persuasive, upon closer inspection the unfairness justification
weakens considerably. This Section suggests that the unfairness
argument is largely speculative and overstated.
The premise of the unfairness argument—that many antitrust
plaintiffs employ coercive whipsaw tactics—appears more theoretical
than real. In particular, “there is little hard evidence that unfair
158
whipsaw settlements are pervasive in the antitrust arena,” that
159
antitrust plaintiffs target defendants for anticompetitive purposes,
or that there has been any “case in which a small, relatively less
culpable defendant has actually paid an outlandish judgment resulting
160
in bankruptcy.” Although there are a couple of well-trod anecdotes

158. Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1302.
159. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 14 (“Although it has been suggested that
a plaintiff may target a particular defendant to satisfy the judgment for anticompetitive
purposes, there is no evidence to suggest that judgments have been disproportionately or
unfairly executed on a widespread basis.”).
160. Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 13 (testimony of Stephen D.
Susman, Esq., Susman & McGowan) (“There is no empirical evidence that any antitrust
settlement or judgment has ever bankrupted a defendant.”); id. at 473 (statement of James F.
Rill, Esq., Collier, Shannon, Rill & Scott) (“I am not aware of any instance in which a company
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of whipsawing creating a seemingly unfair result, there is no evidence
161
of a systemic problem. Each anecdote “is subject to case-by-case
162
rebuttals which rob it of much of its force.”
Although there are some well-known examples of antitrust
163
plaintiffs suing only one alleged conspirator from a cartel, these
cases are well-known because they are exceptional. For attorneys who
bring private antitrust suits, “it is a generally recognized practice
among plaintiffs to name as defendants as many of the coconspirators as may reasonably be expected to be liable, so as to
164
ensure full recovery.” More importantly, even if some conspirators
are not named as defendants by a particular plaintiff, “in any given
case there may be any number of other potential plaintiffs who were
damaged by the particular restraint of trade or monopoly in which the
165
prospective third-party defendant has been a participant.” So if one

has been forced into bankruptcy because of the execution of an adverse judgment rendered in
an antitrust lawsuit.”); id. at 477 (statement of Robert P. Taylor) (“I am not aware of any
situation in which a defendant has been forced into bankruptcy by having to satisfy an antitrust
judgment.”); A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 14 (“The Subcommittee has also
been given few, if any, examples in which small defendants were forced to shoulder grossly
disproportionate liability for nationwide conspiracies.” (quoting STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 98TH CONG., PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO ALLOCATE DAMAGES AMONG
DEFENDANTS IN PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION (Comm. Print 1983), reprinted in 44
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 280 (Feb. 10, 1983))).
161. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 17 (“Unfortunately, there is no
systematic data which allows one to quantify the frequency or amounts of so-called coerced
settlements.”); Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1301 (“A careful review of the legislative debates
concerning damage allocation reform suggests that the unfairness arguments have been
generated by a few well-publicized cases. The problem is hence not as pervasive as it might
appear at first glance.”).
162. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 18.
163. See, e.g., Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 649 F.2d 1370, 1372–73 (10th Cir.
1979) (examining Olson Farms’s claim for contribution against Safeway Stores after Olson
Farms had been previously found liable as the sole defendant in an antitrust suit).
164. Dickinson, supra note 20, at 172 (citing Peter G. Corbett, Apportionment of Damages
and Contribution Among Coconspirators in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, 31 FORDHAM L.
REV. 111, 111 (1962)); see also Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 236
(testimony of William W. Schwarzer, J., Northern District of California) (“[I]n most antitrust
cases, the plaintiffs tend to join all of those prospective or alleged wrongdoers who are solvent
and are likely to be in a financial position to make a contribution, so it is not going to be a very
common case in which a defendant will need to bring in additional parties, people that are
obviously left out.”); Jacobson, supra note 51, at 235 (“In the typical complex price-fixing class
action, plaintiffs almost invariably join all conceivable parties . . . .”).
165. Prof’l Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Nat’l Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1189 (8th Cir.
1979) (Hanson, J., dissenting in part), abrogated by Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
451 U.S. 630 (1981).
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particular plaintiff decides to exclude its business partners as
defendants, other potential plaintiffs could sue those price fixers who
were not named in the previous lawsuit.
Furthermore, the unfairness arguments espoused by proponents
of contribution are premised on the relative culpability of the pricefixing firms. Although some scholars talk about the possibility of “the
most culpable defendants” paying less than “the least culpable
166
defendants,” the degrees-of-culpability concept fails to describe
most cartels. All members of the price-fixing cartel do the same thing;
some just have a greater market share and thus profit more from the
167
conspiracy. Simply because one firm in the cartel had a greater
market share than another conspirator does not automatically mean
the former is more culpable for the crime based merely on its greater
volume of sales at the same artificially high price as its competitors.
Even if one were to accept the premise that one firm is more
culpable than the others, it would be difficult to identify this firm with
any precision or consistency. That one firm has a greater market
share than the others does not necessarily mean that it is more
culpable or necessarily caused more damage than the other members
of the cartel. While courts may use market share to allocate financial
responsibility in tort cases, price-fixing conspiracies are
distinguishable because the firms with a smaller market share have
enabled the firm with a larger market share to inflict injury. After all,
if the smaller members of the cartel had not participated in the
conspiracy, then the firm with a large market share would not have
been able to successfully charge the cartel price.
In essence, every member of a price-fixing conspiracy is
responsible for all of the damages. In many criminal conspiracies, a
reluctant participant can generally be replaced by someone else with
similar skills—for example, the safe cracker in a bank-robbing
conspiracy. In contrast, the market determines which firms are
necessary participants for a price-fixing conspiracy to succeed and
[i]f any competitor insists on price competition, either the conspiracy
will fail or the uncooperative competitor will dramatically increase

166. Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1290; see also id. at 1302 (discussing the “degree of
culpability” among price-fixing conspirators).
167. If there is any firm that is “more culpable,” it is the ringleader. But the ringleader is not
necessarily the firm with the greatest market share. Also, it can be difficult to determine who
the ringleader is. Leslie, supra note 149, at 480.
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its market share, to the benefit of the public paying lower prices and
to the substantial detriment of the co-conspirators. The conspiracy is
168
not likely to survive long under such circumstances.

Depending on the market structure and concentration, each
169
conspirator can be a but-for cause of all cartel injuries.
Fairness arguments made in support of JSAs are also
unpersuasive given their source. Although fairness arguments are
most credible when made by innocents, those claiming the need for
170
JSAs (or contribution) are generally wrongdoers in their own right.
When members of a price-fixing conspiracy attempt to share risk
through a JSA, it is important to remember that the signatories are
171
not merely intentional tortfeasors, they are often criminals. For
example, the party seeking contribution has often already pled guilty
172
or nolo contendere to criminal price-fixing charges. The unfairness
168. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, app. A at 69 (Minority Report on
Contribution); see also Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 7 (statement of
A. Stephens Clay, Esq., Kilpatrick & Cody) (discussing the need for cooperation from each
member of a price-fixing conspiracy); A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 21 (“For a
cartel to be stable and effective, it must control enough of the production capacity of an industry
so that when its members raise prices and correspondingly reduce output, outsiders cannot take
up the slack.”); Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1296 (“[T]he success of a conspiracy depends on the
participation of all members. In this ‘one for all and all for one’ atmosphere, it is difficult to
assess individual liability based on degree of participation or benefits derived. In effect,
responsibility is indivisible, and the concept of contribution is somewhat artificial.”);
Hutchinson, supra note 8, at 982 (“A policy holding all participants responsible for the effects of
a concerted scheme is particularly appropriate in the antitrust area since, by economic necessity,
the success of an anticompetitive scheme often depends on the participation of each. In a real
sense, each defendant has caused the entire amount of damages.” (footnote omitted)).
As Justice White noted in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S.
134 (1968), “neither defendant, if he acted alone, could be charged with the violation; some
degree of participation by both is essential to create a combination within the reach of § 1 of the
Sherman Act,” id. at 144 (White, J., concurring).
169. S. REP NO. 96-428, at 29 (1979) (supplemental views of Sen. Metzenbaum & Sen.
Kennedy); Corbett, supra note 164, at 116 (citing City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry &
Pipeworks, 127 F. 23, 25–26 (6th Cir. 1903)).
170. Easterbrook et al., supra note 95, at 339 (“The first thing to be noted about the fairness
issue is that the party claiming to have been unfairly treated is himself an intentional
wrongdoer.”); see also Floyd, supra note 51, at 213 (“[C]ontribution is inappropriate in the case
of intentional wrongdoers . . . .”).
171. This Article does not address unintentional violations, which are theoretically possible
and have unique arguments in support of contribution. See Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v.
Tex. Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 906–08 (5th Cir. 1979) (Morgan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing in favor of awarding contribution to unintentional antitrust
violaters), aff’d sub nom. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
172. See, e.g., Tex. Indus., 451 U.S. at 633 n.4; USX Corp. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 738 N.E.2d
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examples paraded out by procontribution commentators generally
173
involve actual cartels, not false positives. These parties were in total
control of their risk of being subjected to an “unfair whipsaw.” The
easiest way to minimize the risk of being saddled with joint and
several liability for treble the harm inflicted by a cartel is to not
174
participate in a cartel in the first place. Thus, it is difficult to feel
sorry for Olson Farms—the lone defendant in a price-fixing case
infamous for that reason—because “[a]lthough Olson Farms allegedly
purchased only eleven percent of the eggs sold by the plaintiffs,
without its cooperation the conspiracy might have broken up with no
injury to the plaintiffs. In that sense, Olson Farms was responsible for
175
the plaintiffs’ entire loss.” While fairness arguments would be
176
persuasive if advanced by innocent defendants, the anecdotal
177
evidence suggests that innocent firms do not enter into JSAs. With a
JSA, an innocent firm would be obligated to pay a percentage of the
cartel overcharge, even if it did not participate in the cartel. True
178
innocents can best protect themselves in court. In contrast, for truly
culpable defendants—who lobby for statutory contribution and

13, 19 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (“The evidence presented to the trial court showed that B & LE
pleaded no contest to a criminal indictment for violating the Sherman Act by engaging in the
iron ore conspiracy . . . .”).
173. For example, after being the only party sued in an antitrust conspiracy, Olson Farms
turned around and sued its co-conspirators, “alleging that they were participants in the unlawful
conspiracy and thus liable to Olson Farms for contribution in respect to the judgment arising
out of the original action.” Dickinson, supra note 20, at 151. If Olson Farms wanted to avoid the
joint and several liability conundrum, it could have easily obeyed the law.
174. See Easterbrook et al., supra note 95, at 364 (“[T]he prospective antitrust violator can
avoid the harshness of the no-contribution rule simply by complying with the antitrust laws.”).
175. Note, supra note 15, at 903–04 n.73.
176. Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings, supra note 25, at 6 (testimony of John
Shenefield, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, Department of Justice) (“When one
considers this possibility from the standpoint of an innocent defendant, who could not afford to
risk putting its innocence to the test, there is indeed an unfairness which contribution rules such
as this one might ameliorate.”); S. REP NO. 96-428, at 19 (1979) (“[I]t is necessary to balance the
desire to terminate antitrust cases in as rapid a manner as possible with the rights of the
defendants to utilize the courts to assert their innocence.”).
177. See Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings, supra note 25, at 72 (statement of
Robert P. Taylor, Attorney) (“Because Utah-Idaho believed itself to be totally innocent of
wrongdoing, the company was extremely reluctant to enter into a judgment sharing agreement
based upon sales.”).
178. See id. at 51 (testimony of Lowell E. Sachnoff, Attorney); see also, e.g., id. at 68
(statement of Donald G. Kempf Jr.) (discussing the need for defendants to be able to litigate
their individual antitrust cases on the merits).
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negotiate JSAs whenever possible—cries of unfairness ring hollow
179
given the well-understood penalties for price fixing.
Furthermore, any asymmetry in settlement amounts among
price-fixing defendants raises fewer fairness concerns when one
considers defendants’ positions ex ante. Those critics who lament the
higher payouts by later-settling defendants focus exclusively on the
180
outcomes ex post. This ignores the fact that all defendants generally
have the same opportunity to approach plaintiffs with evidence and
make a deal. Remaining silent in the hope that no member of the
cartel will break ranks and having accepted the risk that its coconspirators will settle first, the holdout defendant is not in a position
to cry foul when its gamble does not pay off. At the time that a pricefixing suit is filed, there is ex ante equity among the suspected
conspirators. Any defendant who does not want to be left holding the
bag should provide evidence against its co-conspirators and settle. It
cannot make credible fairness arguments based solely on ex post
181
inequity. As Professor Lawrence Sullivan explained to Congress
during the 1980s debate over antitrust contribution:
Any defendant that suffers a big verdict are [sic] not a hopeless
victim. First, it made a decision to participate in an unlawful
conspiracy, and did so in order to make monopoly profits at the
expense of consumers. Next, it made a strategic decision not to settle
on terms on which others did settle. There is no obvious reason why
182
such a firm should be regarded as victims [sic] of unfairness.

Even after the cartel is operating, each participating firm
possesses the power to prevent itself from being “unfairly” saddled
with the bulk of the liability—it can confess its participation in the

179. See Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 91 (statement of Harold E.
Kohn, Esq., Kohn, Savett, Marion & Graf, P.C.) (“[T]he ancient maxim is: ‘Equity is not
concerned about contributions among persons who are engaged in an illegal activity.’”).
180. See, e.g., Jacobson, supra note 51, at 221 (discussing In Re Corrugated Container
Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40, 41 (S.D. Tex.), aff’d, 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1979)); Laura J.
Lodawer, Note, Contribution in Antitrust Actions: Is Fairness Reason Enough?, 14 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 575, 586 (1983) (same).
181. But see Note, Contribution in Private Antitrust Actions, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1540, 1543–44
(1980) (“[E]x ante equity cannot eliminate ex post inequity, for the ex post unfairness of a nocontribution rule remains regardless of the state of affairs ex ante.”).
182. Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 509 (letter from Lawrence A.
Sullivan, Earl Warren Professor of Public Law, University of Chicago, The Law School, to Peter
W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
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cartel to the DOJ’s Antitrust Division in exchange for amnesty, which
would immunize the firm from all criminal liability and limit any
183
damages in private litigation to single damages. Any defendant that
finds itself at the end of the whipsaw has only itself to blame for not
confessing to federal antitrust authorities in a timely manner. In short,
the fact that a firm pays a higher settlement because it chose to join a
price-fixing conspiracy and then failed to seek amnesty (or reach a
settlement with plaintiffs) in a timely manner represents bad
decisionmaking by the firm, not unfairness foisted upon it by an
unjust system.
While many condemn the absence of contribution as facilitating
antitrust plaintiffs’ efforts to squeeze disproportionately large
184
settlements out of innocent defendants, this concern appears more
fanciful than factual. First, rational antitrust plaintiffs would not
pursue a strategy of granting sweetheart deals to culpable defendants
in the hopes of coercing a large settlement out of an innocent party.
An innocent defendant is more likely to win at trial, in which case the
antitrust plaintiff receives nothing except the early cheap settlements.
As the American Bar Association Minority Report on Contribution
noted, “No plaintiff wants to try his case against the most innocent or
poorest defendant. . . . Plaintiffs prefer to try their cases against the
185
very bad, very rich defendants.” Second, defendants who believe
that they can prove their innocence are more likely to resist paying a
high settlement than defendants who know their liability will be
established at trial. Thus, innocents are less susceptible to pressure
186
than the guilty. Rational plaintiffs would rather take advantage of
183. See Status Report, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Status Report: An Overview of
Recent Developments in the Antitrust Division’s Criminal Enforcement Program 7–10 (2004),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/202531.pdf (discussing the basics of the
Antitrust Division’s amnesty program).
184. See A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, app. A at 66 (Minority Report on
Contribution); Floyd, supra note 51, at 206 (“The more serious concern is that the settlement
strategy employed by plaintiffs’ counsel has operated in practice to permit larger and more
culpable defendants to settle early, leaving smaller and innocent ones facing liability for an
entire industry in a nationwide class action suit as a result.”); supra notes 67–69 and
accompanying text; see also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Contribution and Claim
Reduction Among Antitrust Defendants: An Economic Analysis, 33 STAN. L. REV. 447, 449
(1981) (“[T]he no contribution rule achieves deterrence by imposing greater risks on innocent
parties.”).
185. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, app. A at 66 (Minority Report on
Contribution).
186. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 184, at 461 (“Defendants who are confident that
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the most vulnerable target when seeking the big payoff from the last
187
settlements.
Finally, no empirical evidence suggests antitrust
plaintiffs normally enter into sweetheart deals in order to pursue
188
innocent targets.
Although many commentators bemoan the risk of antitrust
plaintiffs using whipsaw tactics to harass smaller defendants in price189
fixing conspiracy cases, the story traditionally spun is facially
implausible. It would be irrational for an antitrust plaintiff to give
deep-pocket defendants the break because smaller defendants are
190
more likely to avoid payment by declaring bankruptcy. While
evidence indicates that plaintiffs do in fact consider defendants’
191
financial situation when negotiating and accepting settlement offers,
they have committed no violations . . . will tend to be relatively optimistic . . . .”).
187. Floyd, supra note 51, at 192.
188. See S. REP NO. 96-428, at 37 (1979) (supplemental views of Sen. Metzenbaum & Sen.
Kennedy) (“We have been presented with absolutely no evidence that the larger, more
‘culpable’ defendants routinely settle price-fixing suits early in the litigation.”); A.B.A.
ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, app. A at 66 (Minority Report on Contribution) (“Whether
such a dilemma has been so frequent and serious a phenomenon as to require legislative
solution has not been proved. Certainly such a settlement approach does not comport with
traditional litigation strategy.”); see also Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at
8 (statement of A. Stephens Clay, Esq., Kilpatrick & Cody) (“Speaking from experience, I can
tell you that plaintiffs do not prefer to try their cases against the most innocent or the poorest
defendants.”); Floyd, supra note 51, at 206 (“It seems unlikely that plaintiffs’ counsel would
deliberately pursue a strategy of settling with larger, more culpable, and more financially
responsible defendants at bargain rates in order that they might preserve their claims against
innocent defendants who would be unable to discharge a jury verdict against them in any
event.”).
189. See supra notes 70−72 and accompanying text.
190. S. REP. NO. 96-428, at 38 (supplemental views of Sen. Metzenbaum & Sen. Kennedy)
(“Plaintiffs have no interest in forcing a small company to bear the burden of lengthy and
extraordinarily expensive litigation and the risk of bankruptcy.”); id. at 37 (“Professor Rose
points out that ‘it is not known whether plaintiffs settle early with the larger defendants with any
frequency. Moreover, it seems unlikely that plaintiffs would select large, more culpable
defendants for easy treatment and consciously shift the burden of the judgment to smaller
firms.’” (quoting Jonathan Rose, Professor, Sandra Day O’Connor Coll. of Law, Ariz. State
Univ., Address at the ABA Antitrust Section Meeting (Aug. 13, 1979))); Easterbrook et al.,
supra note 95, at 343 (“At all events, there is no apparent reason why antitrust plaintiffs could
generally seek to obtain disproportionately large recoveries from the smaller or less responsible
defendants. If a plaintiff settles for a small amount with the larger defendants and proceeds to
trial against the smaller defendants, he increases his risk that any judgment will be
unsatisfied.”).
191. Riemer, supra note 7, at 307 (“There is much evidence that plaintiffs do consider the
financial condition of particular defendants in evaluating possible settlement terms.”); see also,
e.g., In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 321 F. Supp. 2d 619, 632 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (mentioning the
plaintiff’s assertion that the defendant’s financial situation was a factor that affected the
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this calculus favors smaller firms. Plaintiffs are generally willing to
192
accept less money from smaller defendants. This makes sense
because large firms are more capable of paying a large settlement or a
193
significant jury award. Also, a savvy antitrust plaintiff will avoid
taking only smaller firms to trial because they are better able to play
194
on the jury’s sympathy. Finally, again, there is no evidence of
plaintiffs using whipsaw tactics to force smaller firms to acquiesce to
195
disproportionate settlement demands.
For the same reasons that rational plaintiffs will not grant
sweetheart deals to large players with deep pockets in order to create
leverage against smaller or less culpable defendants, plaintiffs are
unlikely to pursue a strategy that risks bankrupting their quarry. No
rational plaintiff has an incentive to drive any defendant into
bankruptcy or to otherwise render it judgment-proof; nor would it
want the last settling firm to have even a credible threat of declaring
bankruptcy. The threat of bankruptcy emboldens the targeted

settlement amount).
192. Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 93 (statement of Harold E.
Kohn, Esq., Kohn, Savett, Marion & Graf, P.C.) (“We have been settling cases with small
businessmen who happen to be caught up in a conspiracy involving larger businessmen. We
invariably settle for a much lesser figure with the small businessman.”); Riemer, supra note 7, at
294 n.33 (“Indeed, there is much evidence supporting the conclusion that plaintiffs consider a
defendant’s ability to pay in negotiating settlements and are likely to be satisfied with
proportionately smaller recoveries from smaller defendants.”).
193. See Hutchinson, supra note 8, at 984 (“Since a strong market power is often crucial to
the plaintiff’s case, it seems unlikely that a plaintiff would, without some qualms, allow a
powerful defendant to buy its peace cheaply.”); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 184, at 455–56
(“[A] firm with large assets might expect to pay a disproportionately large share of joint
damages since it might predict that the plaintiff will choose to collect a disproportionate share of
joint damages from it.”).
194. Easterbrook et al., supra note 95, at 343.
195. See S. REP NO. 96-428, at 37 (supplemental views of Sen. Metzenbaum & Sen.
Kennedy) (“Neither have we seen any evidence demonstrating that small defendants are
ultimately forced to settle against their will for unreasonable amounts because of earlier
settlements by larger defendants.”); A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 14 (“The
Subcommittee has also been given few, if any, examples in which small defendants were forced
to shoulder grossly disproportionate liability for nationwide conspiracies.” (quoting STAFF OF
THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 98TH CONG., supra note 160)); Easterbrook et al., supra
note 95, at 364 (“Nor is there persuasive evidence that some identifiable class of antitrust
violators, such as small firms, are systematically at a disadvantage under the no-contribution
rule compared to a contribution rule.”); see also Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings,
supra note 25, at 60 (testimony of Lowell E. Sachnoff, Attorney) (discussing the willingness of
plaintiffs’ attorneys to settle for smaller amounts with smaller defendants).
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defendant and gives it leverage to pay less to an antitrust plaintiff.
Indeed, the risk of bankruptcy means that the plaintiff and defendant
share a strong incentive to settle the litigation on mutually
acceptable—and reasonable—terms. In antitrust class action
litigation—in which proposed settlements must be approved by the
197
court —the risk that posttrial damages may bankrupt the defendant
is a factor that courts consider in determining whether a settlement
198
offer to the class is reasonable. Not surprisingly, there is no
empirical evidence of antitrust plaintiffs pursuing whipsaw settlement
199
strategies that could bankrupt the remaining defendants. In short,
JSAs are not necessary to prevent antitrust litigation from driving
firms into bankruptcy.
In sum, the fairness arguments in support of contribution—
whether by statute, judicial fiat, or contract—are facially attractive,
but wither under close scrutiny. The factual predicates of the fairness
arguments—that small or innocent defendants are forced to pay
disproportionately high settlements under threat of bankruptcy—are
false. Furthermore, procontribution commentary generally fails to
recognize that price-fixing defendants have constructed their dilemma
through their own misdeeds. Finally, whatever their strength, the
fairness arguments must be considered in light of other

196. See, e.g., Riemer, supra note 7, at 307 n.133 (discussing a memorandum filed by the
plaintiffs in In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 560 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Ga. 1979), in which
“plaintiffs expressed willingness to settle with defendant H&H Poultry for less than the
[amount] being demanded of other defendants because H&H was ‘hovering on the brink of
bankruptcy’” (quoting the memorandum)); see also Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings,
supra note 25, at 95 (statement of Harold E. Kohn, Esq., Kohn, Savett, Marion & Graf, P.C.)
(“There is not one recorded or unrecorded instance where any small businessman was put out
of business by any price-fixing case or any settlement in a price-fixing case.”); S. REP NO. 96428, at 37 (supplemental views of Sen. Metzenbaum & Sen. Kennedy) (“We have been
presented with absolutely no evidence that the larger, more ‘culpable’ defendants routinely
settle price-fixing suits early in the litigation. Neither have we seen any evidence demonstrating
that small defendants are ultimately forced to settle against their will for unreasonable amounts
because of earlier settlements by larger defendants.”).
197. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
198. See, e.g., In re Warner Commc’ns Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
199. See A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 14 (“After hearing extensive
testimony on the issue, a House Subcommittee Staff Report concluded: ‘The Subcommittee is
aware of no case in which a small, relatively less culpable defendant has actually paid an
outlandish judgment resulting in bankruptcy.’” (quoting STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 98TH CONG., supra note 160)).
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considerations, such as deterrence of price-fixing conspiracies, as the
next Section explores.
B. Judgment-Sharing Agreements Undermine Deterrence of Price
Fixing
Any examination of JSAs must weigh the fairness arguments
against the likely effects of these agreements on deterrence. The
Supreme Court has often recognized that a “principal purpose of the
anti-trust private cause of action is, of course, to deter anticompetitive
200
practices.” No change in antitrust policy should take place without
considering deterrence of antitrust violations, particularly price fixing.
Deterrence is a function of three factors: the size of penalties,
probability of liability, and risk aversion. First, raising the penalties
associated with a violation of the law generally increases deterrence.
Second, increasing the likelihood that offenders will be caught and
held liable raises the expected costs of wrongdoing and thus increases
the probability that firms will conclude that the offense is not costbeneficial. Third, a firm’s level of risk aversion will affect what
combination of penalties and probability of liability the firm is willing
to accept. If a firm is risk averse, it “looks not only at the expected
value of the risk, but also its absolute magnitude, and it avoids
strategies that subject it to the potential of a greater absolute loss
201
even if it is less likely to suffer that loss.”
If the availability of JSAs affects any of these factors, these
agreements could shape the level of antitrust deterrence. Judgmentsharing agreements may affect all three variables. First, it may seem
that JSAs should not change the penalty part of the deterrence
calculation. In theory, JSAs should not influence the amount of
damages in the event of liability because in a private case alleging
horizontal price-fixing, the damages are treble the aggregate illegal
overcharges charged by all of the cartel members, which should be a
set number regardless of how the conspirators attempt to allocate
liability through a JSA. While the above reasoning is true, it neglects
202
the fact that the vast majority of price-fixing cases settle and the
200. Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 572 (1982) (citation
omitted); accord Pfizer v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978); Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720,
746 (1977).
201. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 27–28.
202. See Cavanagh, supra note 91, at 813 (“The Georgetown data indicate that 88.2% of the
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ultimate penalty is not a function of treble the overcharge, but rather
what the parties negotiate. Because JSAs lead to smaller aggregate
203
settlements, they effectively reduce the penalty for price-fixing.
Second, even if JSAs do not affect the conspiracy’s total damages
upon a finding of liability, such agreements do diminish the
probability that price fixers will be held liable for their antitrust
violations. Previous analyses of the antitrust contribution issue have
focused exclusively on the probability of individual liability assuming
204
that the cartel as a whole is caught and successfully held liable. This
overlooks a more fundamental inquiry: how does the presence of a
JSA affect the probability of the cartel as a whole evading liability?
Economic analyses of the effect of contribution rules on deterrence
have assumed that the probability of cartel detection (and subsequent
205
liability) remains constant. But this is not the case. JSAs reduce the
probability of liability for two reasons. First, JSAs reduce the
probability that one of the alleged co-conspirators will settle early,
fund the litigation, and increase the pressure on the remaining
206
defendants to settle. Second, JSAs reduce the likelihood that
207
inculpatory evidence will be collected. While contribution rights
increase the probability of individual accountability if the cartel is
exposed, JSAs increase the probability of the cartel escaping liability
altogether. Consequently, JSAs can reduce deterrence of price-fixing
activity.
Third, JSAs may encourage price fixing among firms that are risk
averse. Whether or not allowing contribution enhances or reduces
antitrust cases surveyed settled.”).
203. See supra notes 96–106 and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 8, at 971–72 (discussing the availability of contribution
as a factor in a business’s cost-benefit analysis before entering a price-fixing conspiracy).
205. See, e.g., Easterbrook et al., supra note 95, at 353 (“Yet even if these conditions do not
obtain, the choice between contribution and no contribution is not affected, at least as a first
approximation, because that choice does not affect the total damages assessed for unlawful joint
action but only the distribution of the damages (ex post, and sometimes ex ante) among those
who participate in the joint action.”); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 184, at 450–52 (calculating
the business incentives both with and without contribution rules but keeping the probability of
detection constant).
Congress, too, assumed no effect on the amount of money the plaintiff could recover. See
S. REP NO. 96-428, at 2 (1979) (“S. 1468 would not, however, change the principle of joint and
several liability and thus would not impair the plaintiff’s rights vis-à-vis any defendant.”). That is
incorrect. See supra notes 96–106 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 39–54 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 125–46 and accompanying text.
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deterrence will largely be a function of price-fixing firms’ willingness
to accept risk. If firms are risk neutral—and the total penalties and
the probability of liability are held constant—contribution rules
should theoretically not affect deterrence. Professors Polinsky and
Shavell explain, “[U]nder no contribution, each defendant faces some
probability of having to pay the entire judgment. Under contribution,
all defendants share the entire judgment, so that each faces a higher
probability of having to pay an amount proportionally less than the
208
entire judgment.” A risk-neutral firm is indifferent between facing a
10 percent probability of paying $80,000,000 and an 80 percent
209
probability of paying $10,000,000. Each has an expected cost of
$8,000,000. The risk-neutral firm is concerned only with the expected
value of alternatives, not the absolute magnitude of any particular
210
outcome.
If the disastrous outcome has a sufficiently low
probability, the risk-neutral firm will pursue a potentially perilous
course so long as that option has a preferable expected value
compared to the available alternatives.
If firms are risk averse, then allowing contribution in antitrust
cases would diminish deterrence. The risk-averse firm focuses not
solely on the relative expected values of various options, but also on
211
the absolute magnitude associated with each alternative. Thus, a
risk-averse firm may decide to pay a $6,000,000 fine instead of
accepting a 5 percent probability of paying a $100,000,000 fine. The
latter has a lower expected cost—$5,000,000 versus $6,000,000—but
the absolute amount of money at risk in the second scenario is
staggering. The more risk averse a firm is, the more likely that it will
212
be deterred by a no-contribution regime. For risk-averse firms,
“economists agree that the deterrent effect of [the] no contribution
rule exceeds the deterrent effect of contribution or claim reduction
since it exposes the potential wrongdoer to a risk of greater absolute
213
magnitude.” For firms whose desire to remain an ongoing business

208. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 184, at 450–51.
209. I have made the probability under the contribution regime 80 percent instead of 100
percent to reflect the uncertainty that any member of the cartel will be held liable.
210. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 184, at 450 (“Risk neutral firms consider only the
‘expected value’ of a risky situation—that is, the magnitude of the risk discounted by its
probability.”).
211. Id. at 452.
212. See BREIT & ELZINGA, supra note 45, at 34.
213. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 28; see also Cavanagh, supra note 16, at
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is paramount, the threat of debilitating damages is a greater deterrent
214
than a higher probability of lower damages. In rejecting a right to
contribution among antitrust defendants, the Fifth Circuit reasoned,
“that very possibility of imposition of sole liability has an enhanced
deterrent effect. The chance that a participant may be faced with a
full judgment is more likely to discourage anticompetitive conduct
than would ensuring that each participant pays only some fair
215
share.”
216
While there is no general consensus among economists, much
217
218
theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that firms are, in fact,
largely risk averse. Firms often behave in a risk-averse manner, such
219
as by purchasing property and liability insurance. The risk aversion
of antitrust defendants is also sometimes indicated by their strong

1307 (“[I]f a firm is risk averse a contribution rule may provide less deterrence.”).
Yet even before the development of modern economics and congressional enactment of
the Sherman Act in 1890, courts had long recognized that a low likelihood of being held liable
for all of the damages may be a better deterrent than allocating financial responsibility among
all the wrongdoers. See Rhea v. White, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 90, 91 (1859) (“[T]here can be no
contribution between wrongdoers. The reason of this is, that they may be intimidated from
committing the wrong, by the danger of each being made responsible for all the
consequences.”).
214. See Hutchinson, supra note 8, at 976 (“The desire that the business survive probably
provides a restraint powerful enough to outweigh even an owner’s strong profit motive. Smaller
businesses, even more than their larger counterparts, can ill afford the cost of antitrust
violations, particularly under a no-contribution rule.”).
215. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Tex. Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir. 1979),
aff’d sub nom. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
216. Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1309 (“Whether firms are, in fact, risk averse has generated
much scholarly debate but has produced no consensus.”); Easterbrook et al., supra note 95, at
352 n.50 (“We conclude that the extent and intensity of risk aversion among firms is an
unsettled empirical question.”).
217. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent
Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55, 56–57 (1979) (presenting theoretical model of firms’ risk
aversion).
218. E.g., KENNETH G. ELZINGA & WILLIAM BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A
STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 128–29 (1976); Hutchinson, supra note 8, at 974 n.81
(“Empirical data supports the existence of risk aversion among a significant population of the
business community.”); see also Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 450
(letter from Lowell Sachnoff, Esq., Sachnoff Weaver & Rubenstein, Ltd, to Peter W. Rodino,
Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“Top level corporate managers are intensely risk
averse . . . .”); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Settlement Black Box, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1257, 1267
(1995) (arguing that, in the context of class action settlements, “[m]ost people are risk averse,
preferring a certain resolution to an uncertain opportunity”).
219. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 184, at 452 n.18.
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220

preference for settlement over litigation. Importantly, firms operate
through managers, who are often conservative by nature and prone to
221
pursue less risky paths, lest a large mistake cost them their careers.
Price-fixing firms, in particular, have demonstrated aversion to
222
risk by entering into JSAs. Signatories to JSAs are risk averse by
definition—they would rather pay a proportion of total damages than
risk paying a greater percentage of the plaintiff’s total damages, even
though the latter risk is low and includes the possibility of paying no
223
damages at all. Also, firms in judgment-sharing arrangements want
to avoid risk so much that they are willing to pay transaction costs to
negotiate JSAs in order to avoid the high-cost, lower-risk event of
being held liable for the bulk of the harm caused by the cartel. Price
fixers incur these transaction costs in order to spread risk. All of this
suggests that JSAs actually reduce cartel deterrence. For risk-averse
firms, the prospects of significant damages awards can deter pricefixing activity. But JSAs effectively cap a price-fixing firm’s exposure
224
in antitrust litigation, which undermines deterrence.
In addition to reducing the maximum penalty, JSAs may also
diminish deterrence by providing greater certainty to firms engaged
in illegal price-fixing. Uncertainty can increase deterrence of
225
conspiracies. Firms often share a general distaste for uncertainty.

220. See Cirace, supra note 55, at 49 n.20.
221. See Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1309 (“A respectable body of literature urges that
corporate managers are risk averse.”); Dickinson, supra note 20, at 188 (“[P]revailing economic
theory . . . labels modern managers as generally risk averse.”).
222. See CHARLES A. BANE, THE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT CONSPIRACIES 314–15 (1973).
While some commentators have suggested that firms breaking the law may actually have a
preference for risk, A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 29 (“[W]hen considering the
behavior of firms which are prone to violate the law, an assumption of risk preference might
even be appropriate . . . .”), firms in illegal cartels are not necessarily risk seekers because pricefixing may have a positive expected value even under bad conditions, such as when the cartel is
exposed and its members are held liable, see, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Why Antitrust Damage
Levels Should Be Raised, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 329, 341 n.48 (2004) (“[R]esearch
demonstrates that the international vitamin cartel generated the largest total of antitrust fines
and penalties in history, which are calculated to be between $4.4 and $5.6 billion. But the
cartel’s monopoly profits in all areas of the world were $9 to $13 billion.” (quoting Brief for
Professors Darren Bush et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4, Empagran, S.A. v.
F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724), 2004 WL 533933)).
223. This statement assumes a constant probability of detection. To the extent that JSAs
reduce the probability of detection, signatories to JSAs could arguably be risk neutral.
224. See Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings, supra note 25, at 62 (statement of
Lowell E. Sachnoff).
225. Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 13 (testimony of Stephen D.
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Indeed, one of the primary reasons that some firms enter price-fixing
conspiracies is to reduce uncertainty. For example, in the infamous
electrical equipment cartels of the 1950s and 1960s, “the
attractiveness of a secure market arrangement represented a major
ingredient drawing corporate officers to the price-fixing violations.
The elimination of competition meant the avoidance of uncertainty,
the formalization and predictability of outcome, the minimization of
226
risks.” By significantly limiting the maximum damages that any one
cartel member could be forced to pay, JSAs can result in risk-averse
firms concluding that price-fixing is either cost-beneficial or at least
227
an acceptable gamble.
If uncertainty is the Achilles’ heel of price-fixing firms, antitrust
policy should retain that vulnerability. But JSAs provide a measure of
certainty by eliminating the risk that a firm will be held liable for all
of the damages associated with the cartel. By entering into JSAs,
firms set the percentage of damages that they are comfortable
accepting instead of competing against each other to make a better
228
deal with the plaintiff. This weakens deterrence. With a JSA in
place, firms can more accurately perform a cost-benefit analysis on
229
the wisdom of joining a price-fixing conspiracy. In the absence of a
contribution mechanism, firms considering joining a cartel may be
230
unable to conduct cost-benefit analysis with sufficient confidence.
Susman, Esq., Susman & McGowan); Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J.
1307, 1342–43 (2003).
226. Geis, supra note 126, at 150.
227. Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings, supra note 25, at 50 (statement of Lowell E.
Sachnoff) (“With contribution, the same businessman who can sit down with his competitors
and fix prices for a product can simply add another item on the agenda; that is, since we can get
contribution, if we are caught, we can then lay off another cost of business, among our
competitors, because we aren’t faced with the serious penalty of joint and several liability.”).
228. Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1314 (“Deterrence may be weakened if price-fixers are
permitted to allocate damages among themselves rather than face liability for all damages
inflicted by a conspiracy.”).
229. Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings, supra note 25, at 27–28 (statement by John
Shenefield, United States Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, Department of Justice) (“By
amending this system so that each conspirator is liable only for that portion of total damages
attributable to his own conduct, potential price-fixers may be more able to predict in advance
their maximum liability and may have reduced incentives to interfere with the successful
functioning of the conspiracy, since a suit by a single plaintiff against any conspirator may well
involve all conspirators in suits for contribution.”); Cavanagh, supra note 16, at 1297 (“In
addition, because a contribution rule makes individual liability more certain, it is easier, at least
in theory, to develop a cost-benefit analysis regarding a company’s illegal acts.”).
230. Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 12 (statement of Stephen D.
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However, the JSA provides greater precision and predictability in the
231
decision to join a cartel and, with the maximum punishment capped
by the JSA, a firm may be more likely to conclude that price-fixing is
232
worth the risk.
Some commentators assert that price-fixing firms do not perform
233
cost-benefit analyses and, even if they did, criminal sanctions and
234
treble damages would be sufficient to deter antitrust violations.
These arguments are unpersuasive. First, like all business decisions,
executives weigh the costs and benefits of cartel participation—price
fixing is never a crime of passion. Second, these sanctions are
currently inadequate, as proven by the fact that major firms continue
to fix prices and enter JSAs to spread the penalties. Third, these
arguments assume that defendants actually pay treble damages, but
235
even defendants found liable often pay less than single damages and
236
most antitrust claims settle for pennies on the dollar. Thus, if
Susman, Esq., Susman & McGowan) (“In addition, the no-contribution rule helps prevent the
type of cost-benefit analysis of potential price fixing that would so easily occur if each defendant
knew in advance that it will have to pay a predictable share of the conspiracy damages.”).
231. Id. at 82 (testimony of Harold E. Kohn, Esq., Kohn, Savett, Marion & Graf, P.C.)
(“[JSAs] can give precise dollar amounts; they can give precise product amounts; they can give
precise percentages of sharing, which they did.”); S. REP. NO. 96-428, at 33 (1979) (supplemental
views of Sen. Metzenbaum & Sen. Kennedy) (discussing the predictability afforded by JSAs).
232. See A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 6, at 24 (“Opponents claim that if
potential wrongdoers knew in advance the amount of their potential liability, which would
ordinarily be much less than the potential liability of the conspiracy as a whole, the balance
against the expected return of the crime would more often tip in favor of violating the law.”).
Because contribution provides firms a way to reduce uncertainty, one early court rejected
contribution in antitrust cases, “believ[ing] that the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws may be
increased by not permitting defendants to redistribute the cost of an antitrust violation.” El
Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., No. C-75-2492 AJZ, 1976 WL 1382, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28,
1976).
Although some contribution proponents have asserted that price-fixers do not engage in
cost-benefit analysis, see, e.g., Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 233
(letter from Hon. Charles B. Renfrew, Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, to members of the H.
Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law), the weight of theoretical and empirical
evidence suggests that price fixers do, see id. at 449 (letter from Lowell Sachnoff, Esq., Sachnoff
Weaver & Rubenstein, Ltd, to Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
233. See, e.g., id. at 233 (letter from Hon. Charles B. Renfrew, Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro,
to members of the H. Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law).
234. See, e.g., id. at 145 (statement of Robert P. Taylor, Esq., Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro);
id. at 233 (letter from Hon. Charles B. Renfrew, Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, to members of the
H. Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law).
235. Lande, supra note 222, at 341 n.48.
236. See Christopher R. Leslie, De Facto Detrebling: The Rush to Settlement in Antitrust
Class Action Litigation, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1009, 1035–36 (2008).
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defendants are only responsible for damages associated with their
own sales and they pay less than single damages for their overcharges,
price-fixing firms can profit from their misdeeds even if caught. In
short, by eliminating joint and several liability, JSAs minimize the
effect of treble damages.
But perhaps the most persuasive evidence that JSAs reduce
deterrence is the fact that price-fixing firms—not simply firms accused
of price-fixing, but firms actually convicted in criminal proceedings—
237
have embraced such agreements so enthusiastically. Convicted
price-fixing firms championed the contribution legislation debated
238
(though ultimately rejected) in the 1980s. The previous national
debates about contribution in antitrust litigation often failed to
consider how price-fixing firms themselves viewed the ability to
allocate antitrust liability based on market share, though some
commentators observed that “the very distaste that antitrust violators
show for the traditional no-contribution rule in itself demonstrates
239
the deterrent value of that rule.” The proliferation of JSAs provides
more concrete evidence that price-fixing firms prefer to manage the
risks of their illegal conduct by preapportioning damages. This does
not bode well for cartel deterrence: price-fixing firms would not enter
into JSAs if such agreements reduced the expected profitability of
cartel activity. Thus, when price-fixing firms and their counsel
champion JSAs as increasing deterrence and facilitating
240
settlements, one must consider the source and be suspicious that
alleged, potential, and actual price-fixing firms tout the deterrent
effect of contribution, but antitrust victims do not. Indeed, innocent
241
firms shun JSAs.

237. See, e.g., BANE, supra note 222, at 234, 314–15.
238. Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 81 (testimony of Harold E.
Kohn, Esq., Kohn, Savett, Marion & Graf, P.C.) (stating that the movement to create a
statutory right to contribution in price-fixing cases “originated a few years ago with a very small
group of companies in the forest products industry who were engaged in probably the most
extensive series of price-fixing conspiracies this country has seen since the electrical conspiracies
of 20 years ago in the early 1960’s”).
239. Id. at 17 (statement of Stephen D. Susman, Esq., Susman & McGowan).
240. See id.; id. at 145 (statement of Robert P. Taylor, Esq., Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro).
241. Id. at 7 (statement of A. Stephens Clay, Esq., Kilpatrick & Cody) (“Defendants who
prefer settlement to long-term litigation generally avoid sharing agreements. They view
litigation as an intolerable expense and risk. They believe themselves innocent, but they are
willing to pay a price to get out of the case.”).
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Unfortunately, to date, courts have not appreciated the
detrimental effects that JSAs may have on deterring antitrust
violations. Without much analysis, some courts have rejected the
argument that JSAs undermine deterrence and have, consequently,
242
declined to invalidate JSAs. For example, the Oklahoma district
court in Cimarron asserted that because JSAs do not violate antitrust
laws “the argument that such agreements should be prohibited due to
243
the policy of deterrence in those laws should logically fail as well.”
In essence, the court assumed the legal conclusion—that JSAs are not
themselves illegal—and then rejected any argument at odds with this
predetermined conclusion. A better understanding of the potential
anticompetitive effects of JSAs may induce greater judicial scrutiny of
such contracts.
C. Low Risk of Overdeterrence
Although some worry that the staggering individual damages
made possible by the lack of contribution in treble-damage antitrust
244
actions could deter beneficial conduct, those arguments hold little
water in the context of price-fixing cases. Overdeterrence concerns
should inform discussions when the scope of antitrust law is
245
imprecise. But they do not really apply when the illegal conduct is
well defined and clearly without redeeming value, such as price-fixing
246
conspiracies. As former Assistant Attorney General William Baxter

242. See, e.g., Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. W. Nat’l Mut. Group, 851 F. Supp. 1361, 1365–66
(D. Minn. 1994); Cimarron Pipeline Constr. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., Nos. CIV-89-822-T,
CIV-89-1886-T, 1992 WL 350612, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 10, 1992) (“The deterrent effect of the
severe penalties imposed upon a party convicted of committing antitrust violations cannot be
deemed to be outweighed by the benefits of a sharing agreement as the Plaintiffs contend.”).
243. Cimarron Pipeline Constr., 1992 WL 350612, at *2.
244. See, e.g., Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 145 (statement of
Robert P. Taylor, Esq., Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro) (“[O]ne must consider the danger that
exposure to massive liability may deter desirable, pro-competitive business behavior.”); Note,
supra note 181, at 1545 (“Indeed, prohibition of contribution could overdeter corporations from
performing acts bordering upon antitrust violations but beneficial to society.”); supra notes
87−90 and accompanying text.
245. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 184, at 462–63.
246. Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings, supra note 25, at 17 (testimony of John
Shenefield, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, Department of Justice) (“In the pricefixing area, however, I don’t have the same kind of concern. I think where you are dealing with
a per se violation of the law and one that is easy to define, one that everybody agrees is harmful,
that the question of overdeterrence is probably not so serious.”); A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION,
supra note 6, at 25 (“[I]t is highly questionable whether unambiguously criminal conduct such as
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noted “[b]ecause true cartel behavior can never yield any benefit, by
247
definition it cannot be overdeterred.”
Importantly, firms concerned about forgoing efficient
agreements out of fear of antitrust liability—magnified by the risk of
joint and several liability without contribution—can protect their
legitimate activities in a variety of ways. For example, they can create
a legitimate joint venture, which could eliminate antitrust liability
248
altogether. Alternatively, antitrust law already contains mechanisms
to prevent deterrence of beneficial collaborations. For example, the
National Cooperative Research and Production Act and the
Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004
provide for single damages for members of properly registered joint
ventures and Standard Setting Organizations that are found liable for
249
violating the Sherman Act. Notably, none of these judicial or
legislative initiatives existed during the last congressional
contribution debate in the 1980s. These avenues would significantly
reduce any antitrust exposure while simultaneously providing some

hard core price fixing can ever be overdeterred.”); BREIT & ELZINGA, supra note 45, at 35 (“If
horizontal price fixing could be correctly defined, the problem of overdeterrence could not
occur since horizontal price fixing has little if any social benefit.”); Cavanagh, supra note 16, at
1297 (“The argument that the present system overdeters is more theoretical than real. . . . [T]he
primary target of the no-contribution rule is horizontal price-fixing, which has no socially useful
benefits and hence cannot be overdeterred.”).
The risks of overdeterring beneficial behavior seem greatest in Section Two cases and in
Section One cases involving vertical restraints. In the context of Section Two of the Sherman
Act—which condemns unilateral conduct characterized as monopolization or attempted
monopolization—an efficient competitor could theoretically be deterred from competing
aggressively but legitimately. While this risk is real, it is unaffected by the presence or absence
of JSAs because there are rarely multiple defendants in Section Two cases. Because JSAs are
not seen in Section Two litigation, condemning them is unlikely to chill the zeal of an aggressive
competitor. In contrast, Section One cases involving restraints generally involve multiple
defendants. Vertical restraints are more likely to increase efficiency than horizontal restraints
and thus antitrust should be more concerned about deterring efficient vertical agreements. But
JSAs appear not in vertical restraint cases, but rather in horizontal price-fixing cases. See, e.g.,
In re Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litig., 817 F.2d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir. 1987).
247. Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 466 (letter from William F.
Baxter, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, to Peter W. Rodino,
Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary); see also id. at 9 (testimony of Stephen D. Susman,
Esq., Susman & McGowan) (“Everyone admits, however, that there is nothing socially useful
about price fixing, and therefore you could not only triple damages, quadruple, tenfold,
twentyfold damages, and there would be no danger whatsoever of deterring socially useful
conduct.”).
248. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 8 (2006).
249. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–05 (2006).
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assurance that the firms’ activities were not unreasonably
anticompetitive. Most notably, these protective measures require the
firms to make their relationship public, as opposed to JSAs, which are
often confidential and do not alert antitrust authorities or affected
250
private parties about any suspect cooperation among competitors.
D. Balancing Deterrence and Unfairness
To the extent that the whipsaw creates some unfairness while
nevertheless enhancing deterrence of price-fixing, the need for
deterrence outweighs the desire to facilitate fairness among
conspirators. Automatic trebling of damages might not be particularly
fair but when Congress originally made the trade-off between
deterrence and fairness, the former prevailed. Congress opted for
treble damages because—while harsh—it would increase
251
deterrence. Congress focused on the need to protect consumers
from price fixers, not the need to protect price fixers from their co252
conspirators.
In rejecting a right to contribution in antitrust
litigation, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]he very idea of treble
damages reveals an intent to punish past, and to deter future,
253
unlawful conduct, not to ameliorate the liability of wrongdoers.” In
short, deterrence of price-fixing is more important than fairness
among price fixers.
Fairness is not irrelevant, but at the margin when trading off
between fairness and deterrence, deterrence trumps. Some judges
have upheld JSAs because they “can ‘ameliorat[e] [the] harsh result’
254
that joint and several liability can pose.” But courts are not

250. See infra notes 256–58 and accompanying text.
251. Hutchinson, supra note 8, at 978 (“Had Congress been concerned with ensuring that
defendants not pay more than the damages they actually caused, it would have limited the
liability to that amount. Instead, it enacted a provision whose most salient features are
deterrent: the provision magnifies the defendant’s penalty and, by overcompensating plaintiffs,
induces them to bring suit.”).
252. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981) (“Moreover, it is
equally clear that the Sherman Act and the provision for treble-damages actions under the
Clayton Act were not adopted for the benefit of the participants in a conspiracy to restrain
trade.”).
253. Id.
254. Phillip A. Proger & Deborah Platt Herman, The Price of Price Fixing Through
International Cartels, 1999 BUS. L. INT’L 24, 48 (quoting In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs
Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997, 1995 WL 221853, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 1995)
(mem.)).
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supposed to ameliorate the harsh results of congressional policies to
deter violations and compensate victims.
V. HOW ANTITRUST LAW SHOULD ADDRESS
JUDGMENT-SHARING AGREEMENTS
Despite the potential for price-fixing firms to employ a JSA as a
cartel-stabilizing device, antitrust law does not recognize the
anticompetitive consequences of such agreements. Those few courts
to consider JSAs have upheld them as legitimate risk-spreading
255
mechanisms. Unfortunately, much of the legitimacy of JSAs stems
from the fact that too little is known about them. Price-fixing
defendants negotiate them in private and their terms are generally
kept confidential. This Part advocates greater transparency and
discoverability of JSAs so that judges and scholars can study and
better understand their effects. Based on future empirical work,
courts should revisit their approval of JSAs. If courts were to
denounce JSAs because they stabilize cartels, judicial condemnation
can either be weak (by rendering JSAs unenforceable) or strong (by
treating JSAs as illegal restraints of trade under Section One of the
Sherman Act). This Part considers both options and concludes that
either approach would currently be premature given our incomplete
knowledge of the net effects of actual JSAs. Instead of arguing that
JSAs represent an antitrust violation in and of themselves, this
Article advocates a role for JSAs in proving the existence of an
underlying illegal price-fixing conspiracy.
A. A Call for Greater Transparency
The primary problem with advocating any significant change in
the law regarding JSAs is the lack of any meaningful empirical data
on their terms and effects. Before courts condemn a species of
contract that has existed for decades, they need a better
understanding of when these agreements are negotiated, what their
terms are, who enters into such agreements, and whether JSAs tend
to act as cartel-stabilizing devices. A better understanding of these
issues will help judges, scholars, and attorneys assess the
anticompetitive potential in any given JSA. The actual terms of JSAs

255. Riemer, supra note 7, at 316 (“Current antitrust doctrine establishes that sharing
agreements do not violate the Sherman Act.”).
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256

will determine their anticompetitive potential, but no systematic
research has been done on the subject.
Two important aspects of JSAs that need exploration are when
they are entered into and who enters into them. First, the timing of
when JSAs are negotiated and signed is significant and warrants
study. Co-conspirators could enter into JSAs either before or after
the threat or onset of litigation. Some commentators assume that
257
firms enter JSAs only after an antitrust violation is detected. But
most JSAs exist in secrecy and little is known about their terms or
timing. At least some JSAs have been in place years before litigation
258
began. And the timing of the agreement may be important in
evaluating its anticompetitive impact. Price-fixing firms may enter
into a JSA before the onset of antitrust litigation because it provides
assurance to risk-averse firms considering whether to join a cartel.
Because the pressure to settle will exist once a price-fixing suit is
filed, some executives may only feel comfortable participating in the
259
conspiracy if the JSA is in place at the outset. After an antitrust
lawsuit is filed, price-fixing defendants are often unable to reach a
judgment-sharing accord given their divergent individual incentives at
260
that point. Judgment-sharing agreements can be difficult and time-

256. See infra notes 300–02 and accompanying text.
257. See, e.g., Mary B. Cranston & John S. Kingdon, Judgment Sharing Agreements, 1985
Research Project of the Civil Practice and Procedure Committee, ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L. 8
(1985) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“A sharing agreement does not necessarily lessen
any deterrent value to the treble damages remedy since it is negotiated and executed after any
alleged wrongdoing and the filing of a lawsuit.”); Riemer, supra note 7, at 314 (“Common-law
principles of contracts also suggest that, because sharing agreements are entered into only after
the occurrence of a violation, such agreements cannot contravene the policy of deterrence.”
(footnote omitted)).
The assumption is reasonable given that most publicly known JSAs were apparently
negotiated after litigation was filed. See, e.g., Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act Hearings, supra
note 25, at 71 (statement of Robert P. Taylor) (discussing the Western Asphalt litigation).
258. Discovery in some products liability litigation has revealed judgment-sharing
agreements that have been in place for over two decades before being disclosed during
litigation. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Production of Joint Defense Agreement at 1, In re Welding Fume Rod Prod. Liab. Litig., No.
1:03-CV-17000, 2005 WL 5408315 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 5, 2005), 2005 WL 3671330.
259. See Reimer, supra note 7, at 313 (“A risk-averse firm, weighing the value and risks of
violating the antitrust laws, likely has no assurance that the other potential co-conspirators will
agree to enter into a sharing agreement if, after the violation, they are sued by the injured
parties.”).
260. See, e.g., id. at 313 n.175.
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261

consuming to negotiate. A firm worried that one of its cartel
partners may defect and provide evidence to an antitrust plaintiff
would rather negotiate and sign this agreement in advance before a
lawsuit is filed and the cartel partners have greater incentive to
defect.
Second, judges and scholars need to understand who enters into
JSAs. Firms that have not engaged in illegal price fixing should be
able to enter into private agreements to spread litigation risk. But this
raises the issue of which firms actually take advantage of JSAs. Most
262
judgment-sharing agreements are confidential,
which makes
generalizing about the signatories to these agreements difficult. Of
those judgment-sharing agreements that have been exposed,
however, many involve firms that have, in fact, engaged in illegal
263
price fixing. If these cases are typical, this reality holds great
significance for antitrust jurisprudence. For example, if JSAs are used
primarily—or perhaps even exclusively—by firms that actually
belonged to price-fixing cartels, that can help build a case for
condemning such agreements and expanding the range of reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from their existence.
How can scholars and policymakers learn more about these and
other aspects of JSAs? Two primary avenues exist to make JSAs
more transparent. First, federal antitrust authorities could take the
lead. For example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) could
require firms to register their judgment-sharing agreements. If the
plaintiff could prove that the defendants had entered into a judgmentsharing agreement but had not properly registered it with the federal
government, this could create a rebuttable presumption that the
judgment-sharing agreement operated as a cartel-stabilizing device.
Section 6 of the Federal Trade Commission Act grants the FTC the
264
authority to use its subpoena powers to pursue investigations. Using
its powers, the FTC could subpoena and review JSAs, publishing the
265
FTC review of otherwise confidential
results of its study.

261. Civil Remedies Issues: Hearings Before the Antitrust Modernization Commission 14–15
(2005) (statement of Harry M. Reasoner, Esq., Vinson & Elkins L.L.P.), http://govinfo.library.
unt.edu/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/Reasoner.pdf.
262. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
263. See, e.g., BANE, supra note 222, at 234.
264. 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2006).
265. Id. § 46(f).
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settlements is not unprecedented: due to the risk of anticompetitive
collusion, settlements between patent applicants in an interference
proceeding must be registered with the FTC, or else the resulting
patent will be rendered unenforceable.
Second, JSAs should be discoverable in private antitrust
litigation against alleged price fixers. Although courts sometimes
266
order production of JSAs, plaintiffs are generally unaware of the
presence of JSAs and, even when they know a JSA exists, plaintiffs
267
are often kept ignorant of the JSA’s terms. Courts often hold that
268
JSAs are not discoverable. Judges have reasoned that “[j]udgment
sharing agreements are, in effect, a form of settlement, and drafts of
settlements and settlement negotiations among counsel are generally
269
not discoverable.”
JSAs should be discoverable for several reasons. First, the
270
existence and terms of JSAs are relevant to the issue of witness bias.
It is common for defendants to settle and testify against their former
cartel partners, and for codefendants at trial to blame each other. If
the defendants in a price-fixing trial are not blaming each other, the
jury may wonder why. If kept unaware of a JSA, the jurors may infer
that there was no cartel. The jury—or judge in a bench trial—should
know about the terms of any JSA because those terms can alter the
defendants’ incentives regarding testimony and trial strategy. Second,
JSAs should be discoverable because they may provide significant
evidence about which firms were participants in—or may have
relevant information about—the alleged price-fixing conspiracy. The
content and circumstances behind the JSA may expose

266. See, e.g., Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., Nos. 98 Civ. 861 RWS, 99 Civ.
3607 RWS, 2003 WL 1345136, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2003); Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v.
Barr Labs., Inc., No. 98 Civ. 861 RWS, 2003 WL 135653, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2003) (mem.);
In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., No. 991317 MDL, 2002 WL 31761289, at *1
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2002).
267. See Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 150 (testimony of Harold
E. Kohn, Esq., Kohn, Savett, Marion & Graf, P.C.) (“In many cases, the plaintiffs don’t even
know the terms of [the JSA].”); Cranston & Kingdon, supra note 257, at 2 (“The challenges that
have thus far been made by plaintiffs’ counsel have been either attempts to discover the
contents of the agreement, or to void the agreement altogether as contrary to public policy. So
far, neither challenge has proved successful in court.”).
268. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 35, at 61 (noting that “courts have refused to
order production of [judgment-sharing] agreements in discovery” (citations omitted)).
269. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, 1995 WL 221853, at *4.
270. See, e.g., Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp., 2003 WL 135653, at *2.

LESLIE IN FINAL FOR WESTLAW AND LEXIS.DOC

810

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/19/2009 11:23:57 AM

[Vol. 58:747

knowledgeable individuals who should be deposed. Third, knowing
the terms of the JSA could help the plaintiff reach partial
271
settlements.
Signatories to JSAs generally argue that the details of their
272
agreements are privileged. However, it is unlikely that a pre-existing
JSA is properly covered by any privilege. First, attorney-client
privilege should not apply because the agreements are not
communications between attorneys and clients in search of legal
273
advice. Furthermore, the privilege does not protect communications
274
made in furtherance of a future crime or fraud. To the extent that a
JSA is part and parcel of a price-fixing conspiracy, the document falls
outside the protection of the attorney-client privilege. Second, JSAs
are not protected under work-product doctrine, which is narrowly
interpreted to apply to an attorney’s impressions, observations and
275
276
opinions. Also, the crime-fraud exception applies here as well.
Most importantly, JSAs are agreements among alleged conspirators.
At a minimum, courts should know the contents of JSAs. If JSAs are
privileged, then cartels could embed price-fixing agreements within
277
JSAs and conceal their illegal contracts from view. Indeed, if
privilege extended to agreements between competitors, price-fixing
agreements themselves could arguably be privileged, an absurd result
that no court should countenance.
Understanding how cartels operate and how JSAs can serve to
simultaneously stabilize and conceal price-fixing activity should

271. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 22, § 13.23 (“Sharing agreements
should be discoverable. Once the agreement is made known, it may be possible to structure
partial settlements to take its terms into account.”).
272. See, e.g., Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp., 2003 WL 135653, at *2.
273. See United States v. Skeddle, 989 F. Supp. 890, 900 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (noting that the
attorney-client privilege only protects communications necessary for providing legal advice).
274. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562–63 (1989).
275. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B) (“If the court orders discovery . . . it must protect against
disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party’s
attorney or other representative concerning the litigation.”).
276. See Zolin, 491 U.S. at 562–63.
277. Cf. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 22, § 13.23 (“In presenting
settlement agreements for judicial approval, however, the parties are obliged to make full
disclosure of all terms and understandings, including any side agreements. The settling parties
may request that certain terms not be disclosed to other parties, but must justify this to the
court.”).
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inform how courts approach legal challenges to both the substance
and secrecy of such agreements among alleged co-conspirators.
B. Judgment-Sharing Agreements as Unenforceable Contracts
The simplest response to concerns about JSAs would be to
render such agreements unenforceable. While businesses can enter
private contracts and have the terms enforced in court, the right to
contract is not absolute. Both state law and federal antitrust law limit
the ability of firms to enter into several types of contracts. Although
no state or federal statute prohibits judgment-sharing agreements, the
common law of contracts can still render them unenforceable. A
contract is unenforceable on public policy grounds if “legislation
provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is
278
clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy.” Most
importantly, the law does not generally allow participants in illegal
conspiracies to fashion their own remedy among themselves.
The argument for unenforceability is straightforward.
Agreements that create inappropriate incentives—for example,
incentives to suppress of relevant evidence of illegal conduct—should
be void as against public policy. Federal courts would never enforce a
price-fixing agreement should a cartel member bring a breach of
contract suit against another firm that cheated on the cartel. Because
JSAs can create incentives for price-fixing firms to continue to
conceal their misdeeds and can stabilize an illegal conspiracy, courts
should also refuse to become de facto cartel-enforcement
279
mechanisms. Furthermore, if the JSA is entered into before the
actual price-fixing occurs, the contract may be void as an attempt to
280
indemnify participants for illegal activity before it occurs. To the
extent that a JSA operates as a form of insurance against antitrust
281
liability, courts could void the agreement as against public policy.

278. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1981).
279. Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 10 (testimony of Stephen D.
Susman, Esq., Susman & McGowan) (arguing that judicial enforcement of a JSA “would be
against public policy, because it would encourage and facilitate a crime”).
280. Cf. Riemer, supra note 7, at 314 (“Although courts uniformly hold that contracts
indemnifying a party for a subsequent illegal act are void, courts have long upheld contracts to
indemnify a party for an illegal act that has already been committed.” (footnotes omitted)).
281. See St. Paul Ins. Cos. v. Talladega Nursing Home, Inc., 606 F.2d 631, 633–34 (5th Cir.
1979). But see Cranston & Kingdon, supra note 257, at 9–10 (“First, a sharing agreement does
not provide for complete indemnification or exemption from responsibility. All parties do bear
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Although JSAs could be held unenforceable under either federal
antitrust law or state common law principles, blanket unenforceability
would be both overinclusive and underinclusive. On the one hand,
this approach could be overinclusive because it would condemn
legitimate risk-spreading accords by innocent defendants who have
done nothing wrong. On the other hand, mere unenforceability may
not go far enough in cases in which the signatories did in fact fix
prices. Agreements need not be legally enforceable in order to
stabilize a cartel. If such contracts were simply unenforceable, the
parties could still legally negotiate and memorialize their agreement.
Even if not enforceable in court, JSAs could form the basis of a
cartel-stabilizing gentlemen’s agreement. Most aspects of agreements
among price-fixing firms are not enforceable in court. For example, in
order to conceal their conspiracy, price-fixing firms agree to forbid
cartel participants from taking notes. Although no court would
recognize legal liability stemming from breach of one of these
agreements, the mere presence of these kinds of agreements has
282
served to stabilize many a cartel in the past. If judgment-sharing
agreements were merely unenforceable, cartel members could
develop alternative enforcement mechanisms. This is essentially how
cartel members deal with the unenforceability of price-fixing
agreements themselves. The mere fact that competitors were able to
come to an unenforceable agreement on damage allocation could
cause co-conspirators to decline to trade a low settlement in exchange
for providing evidence against the former cartel partners, even if it
does not appear in any firm’s individual self-interest to abide by the
agreement. Historically, cartel members often honor agreements that
are against their short-term interests in order to preserve harmonious
283
relations with their cartel partners.
Because mere unenforceability may be insufficient to rid JSAs of
their cartel-stabilizing effects (while at the same time invalidating
legitimate attempts to spread litigation risk), perhaps antitrust law
should condemn those JSAs among firms that have either the purpose
or effect of stabilizing a cartel. This more targeted approach might

a relative share of responsibility for the alleged wrongdoing and are not insured against all
liability.” (footnotes omitted)).
282. The agreements are not perfect, as some individuals may violate the agreement, but
they have a stabilizing influence.
283. Leslie, supra note 148, at 568.
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avoid the problems of under- and overinclusiveness that would result
from simply holding all JSAs to be unenforceable.
C. Judgment-Sharing Agreements as Unreasonable Restraints of
Trade
Section One of the Sherman Act condemns agreements that
284
unreasonably restrain trade. Courts commonly hold that “the
elements of a section 1 violation are threefold: 1) joint or concerted
action between more than one party that 2) unreasonably restrains
285
trade in 3) interstate or foreign commerce.” In determining which
agreements unreasonably restrain trade, courts generally condemn
agreements that stabilize price-fixing conspiracies. For example,
because members of a cartel may cheat by offering discounts on
transportation or extending credit to consumers, many cartels require
286
the use of base-point pricing and prohibit cartel members from
extending credit. Recognizing that these side agreements may
strengthen an underlying cartel, antitrust law proscribes such
287
accords. If JSAs have similar cartel-stabilizing effects, courts could
also hold them violative of antitrust laws.
Antitrust law primarily uses two modes of analysis to determine
whether a challenged restraint of trade is unreasonable: the per se
rule and rule-of-reason analysis. Under the per se rule, certain
categories of agreements are deemed unreasonable as a matter of law.
Those trade restraints that do not fall within a per se category are
evaluated under the rule of reason, in which the factfinder determines
whether the particular challenged agreement has a net
anticompetitive effect.

284. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
285. R.D. Imports Ryno Indus. v. Mazda Distribs., 807 F.2d 1222, 1224 (5th Cir. 1987).
286. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 714 (1948); see also Leslie, supra note 148, at 577–78
(explaining the cartel-stabilizing effects of base-point pricing). Base-point pricing is a practice in
which transportation costs (which are ultimately factored into the price the consumer pays) are
calculated as though all items are shipped from a single location). Aaron S. Edlin, Do
Guaranteed-Low-Price Policies Guarantee High Prices, and Can Antitrust Rise to the Challenge?,
111 HARV. L. REV. 528, 554 n.7 (1997). This prevents firms from cheating on a price-fixing
agreement by cutting transportation costs.
287. See, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 650 (1980) (holding that
agreements to eliminate short-term trade credit are anti-competitive); Cement Inst., 333 U.S. at
721 (upholding the Federal Trade Commission’s conclusion that the base-point pricing system is
an unfair trade practice).
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1. Per Se Rule. JSAs are unlikely candidates for per se illegality.
The Supreme Court has frequently “expressed reluctance to adopt
per se rules . . . ‘where the economic impact of certain practices is not
288
immediately obvious.’” Thus, courts reserve per se condemnation
for agreements “that would always or almost always tend to restrict
289
competition and decrease output.” In applying this standard, federal
judges rely on collective judicial exposure and understanding,
declining to classify a particular category of agreement as per se
illegal until courts have garnered “considerable experience” and can
290
confidently rely on empirical data. Although Part III argues that
JSAs may help price-fixing conspirators stabilize and conceal their
cartel, no body of empirical literature or judicial opinions contends
that JSAs necessarily or inherently decrease output or restrict
competition in a way that inflicts antitrust injury. The absence of
291
relevant judicial experience counsels against per se treatment.
Furthermore, courts decline to condemn trade restraints as
categorically unreasonable unless the practice lacks “any redeeming
292
virtue.” To the extent that JSAs operate as risk-spreading devices
that even defendants that have not violated antitrust laws would
value, JSAs serve a function unrelated to the suppression of
competition, and thus should fall outside of antitrust’s per se rule.
Finally, given the current widespread support of judgment-sharing

288. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 126 S. Ct. 1276, 1279 (2006) (alteration in original) (quoting
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)).
289. Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289–90
(1985) (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Colum. Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979)).
290. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607–08 (1972) (citation omitted); see
also Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 9 (quoting Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. at 607–08);
Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) (“Once experience with a particular kind
of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it,
it has applied a conclusive presumption that the restraint is unreasonable.”); State Oil Co. v.
Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (quoting Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 344); Atl. Richfield Co. v.
USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 342 (1990) (same); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 433 (1990) (same).
291. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 10 (“[E]xperience hardly counsels that we
should outlaw the blanket license as a per se restraint of trade.”); Appalachian Coals v. United
States, 288 U.S. 344, 377 (1933) (“Nothing in theory or experience indicates that the selection of
a common selling agency to represent a number of producers should be deemed to be more
abnormal than the formation of a huge corporation bringing various independent units into one
ownership.”); cf. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984) (“[W]e have decided that it
would be inappropriate to apply a per se rule to this case. This decision is not based on a lack of
judicial experience with this type of arrangement . . . .”).
292. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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agreements, it would simply be too jarring to declare such contracts
per se illegal. It would undermine the legitimacy of antitrust law in a
manner similar to that of the effect of the Supreme Court’s
293
declaration in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. that nonprice
294
vertical restraints are per se illegal, despite the absence of empirical
295
evidence of consistent anticompetitive effects.
2. Rule of Reason. Because JSAs can serve valid business
purposes unrelated to the suppression of competition—risk spreading
and mellowing the harshness of joint and several liability without
contribution—antitrust law should not condemn them as illegal per
se. But neither should it give them a free pass in all instances.
Because JSAs among alleged cartelists carry the inherent risk of
stabilizing or concealing a cartel, they should not be per se legal. With
neither form of per se treatment appropriate, suspect JSAs are perfect
candidates for rule-of-reason analysis.
Under a rule-of-reason analysis, courts would determine whether
a particular JSA is, on balance, anticompetitive. The traditional ruleof-reason factors for evaluating any challenged agreement include its
296
purpose, history, and competitive effects. But these factors may
prove insufficient when analyzing JSAs because these contracts take
place in the shadow of litigation over allegations of the most serious
antitrust violation. If the defendants are found liable on the pricefixing charges, liability for the additional agreement to sign a JSA
would seem to add little to the defendants’ legal woes or the
plaintiffs’ coffers.
Nevertheless, if during litigation the JSA itself can be invalidated
under rule-of-reason analysis, that could prompt cartel members to
provide evidence of price fixing in exchange for a lower settlement.
But, of course, not all JSAs are necessarily entered into by defendants
who have actually conspired to fix prices. This raises the fundamental
question: Is there a way to distinguish between acceptable JSAs and
anticompetitive ones? The rule-of-reason factors for evaluating JSA
should include, at a minimum, the issues for further study discussed in

293. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
294. Id. at 377–78.
295. See Donald E. Knebel, Antitrust Counseling: The Five Factors of Antitrust Liability, 9 J.
CORP. L. 359, 362 (1984) (noting the lack of evidence in Arnold, Schwinn & Co.).
296. Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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Section A. These include: when the JSA was entered into (before or
after the onset of litigation); whether the JSA’s terms prevent
competition among co-conspirators to compete for the best deal with
the plaintiff; and whether the JSA makes individual settlements
practically or contractually unlikely or impossible. Additional
considerations might include whether there is any evidence of intent
to conceal underlying illegal activity and whether the JSA was secret
or publicly acknowledged.
a. Timing of the Judgment-Sharing Agreement. The timing of the
JSA is a relevant factor. If the alleged price fixers entered into a JSA
before any litigation process began or was imminent, this may suggest
that the JSA was part of a cartel agreement. Risk-averse members of
price-fixing cartels may prefer to have a JSA in place at the outset.
This would essentially place a cap on exposure to antitrust damages,
which would allow the firm to conclude that price-fixing was on
balance likely to be cost beneficial. JSAs entered into before the filing
of antitrust litigation may also be more likely to deter a price-fixing
297
firm from seeking amnesty with the DOJ Antitrust Division.
Furthermore, entering a JSA before the commencement of litigation
magnifies the agreement’s evidence-concealing effects because there
is no window between the filing of the price-fixing suit and the signing
of the JSA during which one conspirator could sell out the cartel by
trading evidence for a low settlement. By diminishing the probability
of settlement while creating incentives to conceal evidence,
prelitigation JSAs are particularly dangerous to competition.
In contrast, if the JSA was entered into after a price-fixing case
had been filed or initiated, then it may be less damning. A firm with
valuable evidence against other cartel members would be less likely
to sign a JSA after the plaintiff files a price-fixing suit because at that
moment it can eliminate its exposure at little or no cost by exchanging
its evidence for repose. In contrast, signing the JSA at that point
almost ensures that it will have to pay the plaintiff a greater sum of

297. See supra notes 149–56 and accompanying text.
In theory, a firm cannot get amnesty if the government has already initiated an
investigation into suspected price-fixing. However, if the government has not developed
sufficient evidence to prosecute and the first confessing firm provides such evidence, then that
firm can get amnesty or a particularly attractive deal. See Leslie, supra note 130, at 1659–60
(discussing Christie’s deal in the auction house price-fixing case).
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298

money. This does not suggest a rule of per se legality for
postlitigation JSAs because a JSA can be anticompetitive even if it is
299
entered into after the filing of a price-fixing lawsuit. But this timing
is less inherently suspicious and therefore in the rule-of-reason
analysis would weigh less strongly toward condemning the JSA.
b. Terms of the Judgment-Sharing Agreement. The individual
terms of a judgment-sharing agreement may also render the
agreement an unreasonable restraint of trade. Two areas of concern
stand out. First, JSA terms may unreasonably hinder signatories from
individually settling with the plaintiffs. For example, some JSAs
preclude a co-conspirator from entering into any settlement that does
not require the plaintiff to agree to particular terms (for example,
foregoing joint and several liability). In more extreme cases, JSAs
have “forbade any individual settlement by a signatory and stated
that any settlement offer on behalf of all the participants to the
sharing agreement must be determined by a majority vote of those
300
participants.” The refusal to settle individually smacks of price301
fixing or a group boycott. The defendants should be competing
against each other for the best deal from the buyer, in this case the
antitrust plaintiff.
Second, JSA terms could discourage signatories from providing
evidence of price fixing. Cartel members sometimes operate as a unit,
apparently agreeing to jointly assert Fifth Amendment rights and
302
block plaintiffs’ access to necessary evidence. Any term that
punished cartel exposure or cooperation with plaintiffs’ counsel or
antitrust authorities would clearly demonstrate the anticompetitive
nature of the judgment-sharing agreement. For example, if the
agreement provided a greater share of damages for the first signatory

298. The firm would not have to pay the plaintiff anything if the suit is dismissed or the
defendants prevail at summary judgment, the probability of which increases if the members of
the cartel successfully conceal the incriminating evidence of price fixing.
299. A per se legal rule is also inappropriate because the parties may have already
negotiated the JSA but have waited to sign and date it until litigation is imminent, at which
point all parties execute the previously concealed JSA.
300. Cimarron Pipeline Constr. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., Nos. CIV-89-822-T, CIV-891886-T, 1992 WL 350612, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 10, 1992) (discussing In re San Juan Dupont
Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 129 F.R.D. 424 (D.P.R. 1989)).
301. See Jones Knitting Corp. v. Morgan, 361 F.2d 451, 459 (3d Cir. 1966).
302. See Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 28 (testimony of Stephen
D. Susman, Esq., Susman & McGowan).
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to settle or for any signatory that supplied incriminating evidence
against the other signatories, such terms would suggest that the
agreement was intended as a cartel-stabilizing and cartel-concealing
device and not as a legitimate effort to spread risk among innocent
defendants.
In sum, if particular terms significantly reduce the incentive for
price-fixing defendants to settle or to provide evidence to plaintiffs,
that should count against the signatories in a rule-of-reason analysis.
Given the lack of study, however, it may be too soon to condemn
JSAs because we have an insufficient understanding of their
anticompetitive effects. But this is not a reason to give a complete
pass to JSAs; it is the reason that further study is warranted.
c. Secrecy. The creation of a JSA prior to the onset of price-fixing
litigation might suggest the JSA is used to stabilize a cartel. If so, this
creates a significant incentive for the signatories of such prelitigation
JSAs to keep them secret. If the reforms suggested in Section A were
adopted and signatories still concealed their JSA, that could indicate
an anticompetitive purpose of stabilizing a secret price-fixing
conspiracy. Firms do not generally announce the existence and
substance of their private contracts, nor should they be expected to.
However, because JSAs have the potential for stabilizing price-fixing
conspiracies, they should not be treated as ordinary business contracts
that are inherently confidential. Failing to disclose a JSA when
required to do so by the FTC or in discovery should be considered as
part of the rule-of-reason analysis.
D. Judgment-Sharing Agreements as a Plus Factor
Even if it would be premature to conclude that JSAs may
constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade, JSAs could play a role
in price-fixing cases with respect to the first element of a Section One
claim—the presence of an agreement among firms. Because price
fixing is per se illegal, in most price-fixing litigation the imperative
question is whether or not the defendants actually agreed to fix
prices. In a minority of cases, clear evidence of a conspiracy exists in
the form of written notes memorializing agreements among
competitors or of audio or video recordings of price-fixing
discussions. But antitrust plaintiffs rarely have such a smoking gun.
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Price-fixing plaintiffs generally must prove the existence of an
303
agreement through circumstantial evidence.
Courts refer to the legal test for showing a price-fixing agreement
through circumstantial evidence as “conscious parallelism with plus
304
factors.” Conscious parallelism is the process “not in itself unlawful,
by which firms in a concentrated market might in effect share
monopoly power, setting their prices at a profit-maximizing,
supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared economic
305
interests.” Parallel conduct alone is insufficient to establish an
306
agreement. In addition, the plaintiff must demonstrate the presence
of so-called plus factors that suggest the conscious parallelism was the
307
product of an agreement, not independent action. Common plus
factors include whether the parallel conduct represents a radical
308
change in policy, as well as “actions contrary to a defendant’s
economic self-interest, product uniformity, exchange of price
information and opportunity to meet, and a common motive to
309
conspire or a large number of communications.”
To date, courts and commentators have shunned the idea that
JSAs could constitute a plus factor. Courts do not permit plaintiffs to
refer to the JSA as circumstantial evidence of an underlying price-

303. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 226 (7th Cir. 1978)
(“Most price fixing conspiracies are established through circumstantial evidence.”).
304. See, e.g., Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[A] horizontal pricefixing agreement may be inferred on the basis of conscious parallelism, when such
interdependent conduct is accompanied by circumstantial evidence and plus factors.”);
Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Ga. Theatre, Co., 672 F.2d 485, 501 (5th Cir. 1982) (“The rule of
‘conscious parallelism and plus factors’ has governed proof of much conspiratorial conduct up
through the present.” (citation omitted)).
305. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993).
306. Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1456 (11th Cir. 1991).
307. See Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., Inc., 203 F.3d 1028, 1033 (8th Cir.
2000) (“An agreement is properly inferred from conscious parallelism only when certain ‘plus
factors’ exist.” (citations omitted)); In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir.
1999) (“In the absence of direct evidence, the plaintiffs may nevertheless support their claim
with circumstantial evidence of conscious parallelism.”); Wallace v. Bank of Bartlett, 55 F.3d
1166, 1168 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[P]arallel pricing, without more, does not itself establish a
violation . . . . Courts require additional evidence which they have described as ‘plus factors.’”).
308. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 222 (1939) (“Compliance with
the [film distributors’] proposals involved a radical departure from the previous business
practices of the industry and a drastic increase in admission prices of most of the subsequent-run
theatres.”).
309. Wallace, 55 F.3d at 1168 (citations omitted).
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310

fixing conspiracy.
Jurors generally are prevented from even
311
knowing that the defendants entered into a JSA. The Manual for
Complex Litigation takes the position that if the jury is told about the
JSA—for example, because it is relevant to witness bias—the court
should issue “a limiting instruction that the agreement is not to be
312
considered proof or disproof of liability or damages.” But neither
judges nor the authors of the Manual actually analyze the relationship
between JSAs and price-fixing conspiracies.
There are sound arguments for why the presence of a JSA
between price-fixing defendants could be treated as a relevant plus
factor. Part III explained how JSAs can stabilize a cartel. The mere
fact that competitors are cooperating by entering into an agreement
that increases utility for the group but eliminates the ability of each
individual firm to escape liability at reduced cost suggests the
presence of a group dynamic conducive to cartelization. And if
further study shows that actual price-fixing firms enter into JSAs
more often than innocent firms, then the existence of a JSA may have
even greater probative value.
Again, timing is important. If a JSA were entered into before
antitrust litigation was filed or threatened, this could be indicative of
underlying illegal agreements. Absent litigation or a preexisting pricefixing conspiracy, the members of an industry would seem to have
little cause to meet and negotiate an agreement to allocate damages
in a future price-fixing case. A truly innocent firm would have to
worry that the other members of the industry were engaging in illegal
behavior and setting up the innocent firm to pay a share of any
eventual damages. In contrast, it would be perfectly logical for the
members of an ongoing price-fixing conspiracy to agree—before the
filing of a price-fixing lawsuit—to allocate any future antitrust

310. The congressional debate about contribution yielded this exchange:
Mr. SEIBERLING. Doesn’t the very existence of a sharing agreement tend to
reinforce charges of conspiracy or cartel?
Mr. KOHN. No, the evidence is not permitted. No lawyer would waste time trying to
put it in. No judge would permit it.
Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 25, at 150 (testimony of Harold E. Kohn,
Esq., Kohn, Savett, Marion & Graf, P.C.).
311. Id. at 151 (“I assure you, I have been practicing for 40 years. I have been trying
antitrust cases for 25 years. I have never yet seen the situation where there was the slightest
suggestion with respect to a sharing agreement that ever got before the jury . . . .”).
312. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 22, § 13.23 (footnote omitted).
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damages because this facilitates the cartel’s risk management. It
remains possible that once price-fixing litigation is actually filed, riskaverse defendants may seek to reduce their maximum exposure by
entering into a JSA with their codefendants. More empirical work
needs to be done to answer this question satisfactorily. How often do
truly innocent firms enter into JSAs? If very rarely, then the presence
of the JSA is, in fact, probative. Given the importance of timing
issues, depending on what further research shows, perhaps the
presence of a JSA should only be a plus factor when it is entered into
before the onset of price-fixing litigation.
If the presence of a JSA were treated as a plus factor for
inferring a conspiracy among the signatories, this would raise the
issue of whether juries might assign too much weight to the fact that
price-fixing defendants have entered into a JSA. Juries could
theoretically construe the existence of the JSA as prima facie proof of
a price-fixing conspiracy. But defendants will have the opportunity to
explain why they entered the JSA despite their innocence, and courts
could address the issue of overweighting with a limiting instruction.
To the extent that JSAs operate as a form of risk-spreading
insurance, the evidentiary rule in tort cases that precludes juries from
learning that a defendant has insurance may be analogous and might
313
suggest that a jury should not learn of a JSA’s existence. The
situations, however, are not equivalent. Courts exclude evidence of
insurance because it is both irrelevant and potentially prejudicial
because juries may infer negligence from the fact that the defendant
314
possesses insurance. Insurance coverage is irrelevant because “it
315
simply has no bearing on the fault of a defendant.” As the Advisory
Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence declare, “the
inference of fault from the fact of insurance coverage is a tenuous
316
one, as is its converse.”
Although the rule generally barring admission of insurance
evidence is sound, JSAs are distinguishable. Unlike evidence of
insurance coverage, the presence of a JSA may, in fact, be probative

313. See FED. R. EVID. 411 (“Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability
is not admissible upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise
wrongfully.”).
314. See Ikerd v. Lapworth, 435 F.2d 197, 208 (7th Cir. 1970).
315. Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1391 (11th Cir. 1982).
316. FED. R. EVID. 411 advisory committee’s note.
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of liability, depending on the JSA’s terms, timing, and context. Courts
describe the evidentiary rules regarding insurance as generally
excluding the “existence of a collateral source of revenue to pay a
317
judgment.” But JSAs are not a mere alternative payment source;
rather, JSAs represent a mutual financial commitment among alleged
price fixers to pay each other in the event of liability for illegal
conspiracies. The defendant has obligated itself to pay a portion of its
alleged co-conspirators’ damages. This is markedly different than
traditional insurance policies in which the insured pays a third party
for coverage but does not indemnify its competitors in any way. As
explained in Part III, defendants may enter JSAs to conceal and
stabilize an underlying price-fixing conspiracy. Thus, unlike
conventional liability insurance, the presence of the JSA may be
probative of the underlying liability, not merely of the ability to pay
318
or relative distribution of damage award.
Treating a JSA as merely one plus factor would not necessarily
condemn the signatories as antitrust violators. Courts generally
require a multitude of plus factors before allowing juries to infer a
319
price-fixing agreement. If a defendant’s signature on a JSA were
considered a plus factor, this would lighten the antitrust plaintiff’s
load but not carry it completely. Importantly, antitrust law has
plentiful safeguards to protect innocent defendants. The Supreme
Court has increased the height and number of hurdles that plaintiffs’

317. Williams, 689 F.2d at 1391.
318. Courts also fear that evidence of insurance coverage “would result in extravagant
verdicts” because juries believe that the defendant will not have to pay out of its own pocket.
Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775, 781 (3d Cir. 1965). This is a particular concern in tort
litigation in which the jury can award punitive damages. The risk of a runaway jury awarding
excessive damages is less in antitrust cases because an antitrust jury only calculates
compensatory damages, which the judge trebles. An antitrust jury is generally not asked to
“send a message” to defendants.
Further, JSAs are distinguishable from insurance coverage on this front, as well. Courts
may worry that juries will award a sympathetic plaintiff more money if the jurors believe the
defendant will not be personally responsible because an insurance company will pay. But a JSA
does not allow a liable price-fixing defendant to completely shift financial responsibility to an
absent, deep-pocketed third party. The defendant remains responsible for the JSA-stipulated
percentage of total antitrust damages paid by all of the signatories to the JSA, including
settlement payments and jury awards. In short, informing the jury about the JSA should not
lead to an inappropriate increase in damages awarded by juries in price-fixing cases.
319. See In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Parallel pricing is a
relevant factor to be considered along with the evidence as a whole; if there are sufficient other
‘plus’ factors, an inference of conspiracy can be reasonable.”).
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counsel must clear in order to survive dismissal and summary
320
judgment. Indeed, it is arguably too difficult for antitrust plaintiffs
321
to pursue and succeed on legitimate claims; the likelihood of
frivolous or nonmeritorious claims prevailing is not great. The
presence of a JSA alone would probably be insufficient for a plaintiff
to survive a motion to dismiss, let alone a motion for summary
judgment, when the plaintiff is proving the agreement using conscious
parallelism with plus factors.
In short, the presence of a judgment-sharing agreement among
the members of an industry prior to the onset of litigation may be
circumstantial evidence of an underlying price-fixing conspiracy.
E. Noerr-Pennington Issues
Signatories to a JSA may argue that their agreement is immune
from antitrust liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which
322
protects the ability of firms to jointly pursue litigation. Courts have
expanded Noerr-Pennington immunity to cover tasks ancillary to
323
litigation.
But that does not mean that any contracts that
competitors make with an eye toward eventual litigation are
necessarily protected by Noerr-Pennington immunity. NoerrPennington immunity protects petitioning activity directed toward
government actors. JSAs do not fit within this mold; they are
generally secret agreements among competitors that the parties
intend to conceal from the government. Furthermore, settlement

320. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965–66 (2007) (holding that a valid
claim under Section One of the Sherman Act based on allegations of parallel conduct requires
“enough factual matter” that “raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel
conduct”); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–88 (1986)
(holding that, to survive a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must show evidence that
likely excludes “competing inferences of independent action or collusive action”).
321. See Christopher R. Leslie, Rational Irrationality 41–42 (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Duke Law Journal) (arguing that, “if the plaintiff’s theory of the case conflicts with the
judge’s own view of how businesses operate, the latter will prevail even if the plaintiff provides
strong evidence to support its allegations”).
322. Cal. Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511 (1972).
323. See, e.g., Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 219 F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir.
2000); McGuire Oil Co. v. Mapco, Inc., 958 F.2d 1552, 1560 (11th Cir. 1992); Colum. Pictures
Indus., Inc. v. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc., 944 F.2d 1525, 1528–29 (9th Cir. 1991); Coastal
States Mktg., Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1367 (5th Cir. 1983) (“[I]t would be absurd to hold
that [petitioning immunity] does not protect those acts reasonably and normally attendant upon
effective litigation.”).
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agreements are not necessarily protected by Noerr-Pennington in that
324
settlement agreements can themselves violate the Sherman Act. Of
course, JSAs are not settlement agreements themselves; rather they
are contracts among alleged price fixers that make settlement more
difficult. These agreements should be given no more protection than
settlement agreements themselves. In any case, treating JSAs agreed
to before the filing of antitrust litigation as a plus factor does not
implicate Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Judgment-sharing agreements provide a way for codefendants in
price-fixing cases to manage risk. Businesses should generally be able
to organize their affairs in a manner that reduces their exposure to
legal liability, but that principle has limits. In particular, while
legitimate businesses should be able to minimize uncertainty when
possible, antitrust law should not allow cartels to effectively manage
risk so as to prolong their unlawful existence. JSAs may help cartelists
conceal their illegal agreements and may lead firms to conclude that
price-fixing is cost-beneficial. Judges and scholars should take these
considerations into account when discussing whether price-fixing
defendants should have an unfettered ability to enter into enforceable
judgment-sharing agreements.
Given the ubiquity of JSAs and their potential to facilitate illegal
conspiracies, more study is necessary. Unfortunately, meaningful
empirical research is impossible so long as JSAs largely remain
shielded from public view. If judges order more disclosure of JSAs
that come before them, scholars will be better able to understand how
the timing, frequency, and terms of JSAs may affect the potential
anticompetitive risks associated with those agreements. Also, greater
transparency will permit researchers to determine whether signatories
to JSAs are, in fact, more likely to be firms that have actually fixed
prices or firms that have been falsely accused. If research confirms

324. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 169 (1930) (stating, in holding
that a settlement agreement did not violate antitrust laws, that “[a]ny agreement between
competitors may be illegal if part of a large plan to control interstate markets”); In re
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d 121, 130 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Plaintiffs can
establish a Sherman Act violation by alleging facts from which it can be inferred that
[defendants] entered into the Settlement Agreement in bad faith and used the agreement to
restrain or monopolize trade.”).
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that JSA signatories are primarily price-fixing—not innocent—firms,
that would be strong evidence that such agreements are
anticompetitive.
While additional research will be helpful, antitrust courts need
not await the results of further investigation before scrutinizing JSAs
more closely. Given that JSAs may conceal and stabilize price-fixing
conspiracies—and given the propensity of actual price-fixing firms to
enter JSAs—antitrust law should not treat these agreements as per se
legal. This Article does not argue that JSAs inevitably have
anticompetitive effects, so neither is per se illegality appropriate.
Rather, courts should analyze JSAs under the rule of reason. In
particular, antitrust law should condemn those JSAs that penalize a
signatory for settling early or providing evidence to an antitrust
plaintiff. In addition to an antitrust analysis of the reasonableness of a
particular sharing agreement, this Article argues that the presence of
JSAs may also serve as a plus factor for proving an underlying pricefixing agreement, which would be per se illegal. Consequently, JSAs
may be relevant to both the agreement and the unreasonable restraint
elements of a Section One claim. At a minimum, more research is
warranted to determine how JSAs are negotiated and implemented,
to analyze the consequences of past JSAs, and to predict the effects of
current and future JSAs.

